Hi @ll, in response to EmsiSoft fixed some of the DLL hijacking vulnerabilities in some of their executable installers and unpackers. EmsisoftEmergencyKit.exe still has beginner's errors which allow escalation of privilege for EVERY local user: 0. while the self-extracting WinRAR archive EmsisoftEmergencyKit.exe doesn't load DLLs from its "application directory" any more, its payload but shows this vulnerability! 1. due to "requireAdministrator" in its application manifest the self-extractor runs with administrative rights, although it neither needs them nor uses them. 2. it creates the directory "%SystemDrive%\EEK" and unpacks its payload into it. JFTR: since it runs with administrative rights the self- extractor could create "%SystemDrive%\EEK" with an ACL that only allows write-access for administrators, or use "%ProgramFiles%\EmsiSoft\Emergency Kit" instead. This directory inherits the ACL of its parent, %SystemDrive%, which allows write access for unprivileged users; they can thus modify all files extracted there or add files, for example a "%SystemDrive%\EEK\Version.dll". Also give NetAPI32.dll, NetUtils.dll, SrvCli.dll, WksCli.dll, PropSys.dll, AppHelp.dll, NTMarta.dll, Secur32.dll, MPR.dll and CSCAPI.dll a try. 3. the programs "%SystemDrive%\EEK\Start Commandline Scanner.exe" and "%SystemDrive%\EEK\Start Emergency Kit Scanner.exe" have "requireAdministrator" in their application manifests too: they load and execute the DLLs named above from "%SystemDrive%\EEK" with administrative rights. 4. the other programs extracted to "%SystemDrive%\EEK\bin32" and "%SystemDrive%\EEK\bin64" and are also run with administrative rights. 5. of course the programs in "%SystemDrive%\EEK\bin32" and "%SystemDrive%\EEK\bin64" load and execute DLLs from their "application directory" (which is writable for everyone) too. And one more: 6. the OpenSSL libraries shipped are from version 1.0.2d and have multiple vulnerabilities which have beed fixed in version 1.0.2j. stay tuned Stefan Kanthak Timeline: ~~~~~~~~~ 2016-08-29 vulnerability report sent to vendor 2016-08-29 vendor acknowledges vulnerability, promises to update at least the OpenSSL libraries, and ask the author of WinRAR to add a directive to protect the created EEK directory 2016-11-17 vendor fixed NOTHING in the past ELEVEN weeks, and does not react any more -> report published