Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 14:34:17 -0800 From: aleph1@UNDERGROUND.ORG To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-005) The following is a Security Bulletin from the Microsoft Product Security Notification Service. Please do not reply to this message, as it was sent from an unattended mailbox. ******************************** Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-005) -------------------------------------- BackOffice Server 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File Originally Posted: February 12, 1999 Summary ======= Microsoft (R) has learned of a potential vulnerability in the installer for BackOffice Server (R) 4.0. The installer asks the user to provide the account userid and password for selected services and writes these to a file in order to automate the installation process. However, the file is not deleted when the installation process completes. As detailed below, Microsoft recommends that BackOffice 4.0 customers delete this file. Microsoft has received no reports of customers being adversely affected by this problem. However, it is releasing this security bulletin in order to proactively provide customers with information about the problem in order to allow them to take steps to ensure their safe computing. Issue ===== When a user chooses to install SQL Server (R), Exchange Server (R) or Microsoft Transaction Server (R) as part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation, the BackOffice installer program requests the name and password for the accounts associated with these services. Specifically, it asks for the account name and password for the SQL Executive Logon account, the Exchange Services Account, and the MTS Remote Administration Account. These values are stored in \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini, and used to install the associated services. BackOffice Server does not erase this file when the installation process is completed. This is true regardless of whether the installation process completes successfully or unsuccessfully. By default, the Microsoft BackOffice folder is not shared, so network access to reboot.ini generally does not pose a risk. Users who can log onto the server locally would be able to access the file, but in most cases this ability is granted only to selected users such as administrators. The fix for this problem is to delete the file \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0 installation, whether successful or not. The file is created only by the installer, and, once deleted, will not be re-created unless BackOffice 4.0 is re-installed. Affected Software Versions ========================== The following software versions are affected: - Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0 What Microsoft is Doing ======================= On February 12th, Microsoft sent this security bulletin to customers subscribing to the Microsoft Product Security Notification Service (see http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp for more information about this free customer service). Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) article on this issue: - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004, BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File. http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based Knowledge Base.) What customers Should Do ======================== Microsoft recommends that customers ensure that they delete the file \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after the installation program for BackOffice 4.0 completes More Information ================ Please see the following references for more information related to this issue. - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-005, BackOffice 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File (the Web-posted version of this bulletin), http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-005.asp. - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004, BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File. http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based Knowledge Base.) Obtaining Support on this Issue =============================== If you require technical assistance with this issue, please contact Microsoft Technical Support. For information on contacting Microsoft Technical Support, please see http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp. Revisions ========= - February 12, 1999: Bulletin Created For additional security-related information about Microsoft products, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. (C) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use. ******************************************************************* You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your registration to the Microsoft Product Security Notification Service. You may unsubscribe from this e-mail notification service at any time by sending an e-mail to MICROSOFT_SECURITY-SIGNOFF-REQUEST@ANNOUNCE.MICROSOFT.COM The subject line and message body are not used in processing the request, and can be anything you like. For more information on the Microsoft Security Notification Service please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletin.htm. For security-related information about Microsoft products, please visit the Microsoft Security Advisor web site at http://www.microsoft.com/security. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Tue, 9 Feb 1999 13:35:58 -0500 From: Russ To: NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM Subject: Alert: REBOOT.INI exposes passwords in plaintext The Microsoft BackOffice 4.0 Setup utility creates a file called REBOOT.INI in the \Program Files\Microsoft BackOffice directory which contains plaintext userIDs and Passwords for, at least, the SQL Executive Logon account, the Exchange Services Account, and the MTS Remote Administration Account, if supplied during BackOffice Setup. Other user account passwords may be recorded in this file during setup as well, however my investigations have so far only revealed those mentioned. This file is created and stored with EVERYONE: FULL CONTROL permissions. Obviously this represents a significant risk for BackOffice servers that allow console logons by non-Administrators and/or remote access to the \Program Files directory. Secure@Microsoft.com was informed of this vulnerability well over a week ago. To date, however, they say they have not been able to identify the application that creates the file, or the owners of the vulnerability. Such a response is unacceptable and represents a clear problem in their process of handling vulnerabilities (even if they have been busy recently, the fact they still say they don't know what application creates the file is a big problem). Another potential vulnerability exists in this same directory. REGEDIT.EXE is stored there with EVERYONE: FULL CONTROL permissions. Although proper permissioning of the registry should prevent inappropriate access to it, control over this executable is usually also desired. There's no reason that this file should exist in this directory given it should be accessible via the normal path environment variable, so its existence could allow someone to attempt to use it without auditing or the permission controls that might normally be applied to executables in the \systemroot directory tree. Cheers, Russ - NTBugtraq moderator ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 16:29:31 -0500 From: Russ To: NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM Subject: Re: Alert: REBOOT.INI exposes passwords in plaintext Microsoft have released a Security Bulletin (http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-005.asp) which confirms the issues raised in the NTBugtraq message posted on 2/9/99; http://www.ntbugtraq.com/page_archives_wa.asp?A2=ind9902&L=ntbugtraq&F=P &S=&P=2326 regarding the existence of the REBOOT.INI file and it possibly containing plaintext passwords with userIDs. I would like to acknowledge and thank Angelo Maggio who originally discovered this potential problem and reported it to me after reporting it to Microsoft. Cheers, Russ - NTBugtraq moderator